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Abstract
Until 2014, admissions to the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) were conducted under one
umbrella, whereas the admissions to the non-IIT Centrally Funded Government Institutes (CFTIs)
were conducted under a different umbrella, the Central Seat Allocation Board (CSAB). The same set
of candidates were eligible to apply for a seat in each of the two sets, and several hundred candidates
would indeed receive two seats from the two different sets. Each such candidate could use at most one
of the seats, leaving a vacancy in the other seat; this would be noticed much later, in many cases after
classes began. Such seats would either remain vacant or would be reallocated at a later stage, leading to
logistical hardship for candidates, or inefficiency in seat allocation in the form of unnecessary vacancies,
and also misallocation of seats (e.g., a particular CSAB seat could be offered to a candidate A, despite
denying the same seat earlier to a candidate B with better rank, who had meanwhile taken some IIT
seat). The two sets also operated under different time windows, with the net result that classes would
begin later in the academic year, compared to, say, colleges offering only the sciences.
Since 2015, a new joint seat allocation process has been implemented improving the efficiency and
productivity of concerned stakeholders. The process brings all CFTIs under one umbrella for admissions:
100 institutes and approximately 39000 seats in 2018. In this scheme, each candidate submits a single
choice list over all available programs, and receives no more than a single seat from the system, based
on the choices and the ranks in the relevant merit lists. Significantly, overbooking of seats is forbidden.
Earlier [3], we described the Multi-Round Multi-Run Deferred Acceptance scheme that was first
used for the joint seat allocation in 2015. Crucially, unlike the 2014 and earlier admissions processes,
the scheme seamlessly handles multiplicity of merit lists across different institutes and programs; indeed
every program may have a separate merit list, and these lists need not have any relation with each
other. In addition, the scheme has several other desired objectives. The scheme makes it safe and
optimal for candidates to report their true preferences over programs. The seat allocation produced
does not waste seats and is fair in the sense that it does not give a seat to a lower-ranked candidate
when it was denied to a higher ranked candidate. Further, the allocation is optimal in a formal sense,
providing each candidate with the best possible seat subject to fairness. Without compromising on these
tenets, the scheme factors in various business rules, including reservations for different birth categories,
reservations for home state candidates, and rules regarding dereservation when sufficient candidates are
not available. The scheme also factors in changes that are inevitable when it is discovered, for instance,
that candidates have inadvertently or otherwise, incorrectly declared their birth category, or when it is
discovered that the qualifying criteria have been incorrectly recorded by state education authorities.
Over a period of the last four years, several business rules have changed, added, or dropped. Principal
among them is a rule requiring the allocation of supernumerary seats to females, provided the program
did not have a sufficient desired percentage, while, at the same time, not reducing the amount of seats
available to non-females. The current report incorporates all old and new business rules that were used
in 2018, thereby displaying the versatility of the original method. Instead of providing only changes, this
report provides more details of other process improvements made since 2015, and up to 2018. We hope
that this self contained report will be helpful for the reader, and will also serve as a valuable reference
for joint seat allocations in future years as well.
Looking forward, we posit first that it is inevitable that different colleges will prefer different mech-
anisms of judging merit, and assigning relative rank. For example, programs such as Architecture and
those in the Humanities require different skills. The IITs do not use higher secondary marks in their ad-
mission process. States may impose home quotas, and the Government of India recognizes quotas (and
preferential allotment) among certain birth categories. We believe the ability of our algorithm to grace-
fully handle multiple merit lists gives us hope to express optimism that all undergraduate admissions
in the country, beyond the CFTIs, can beneficially use the suggested scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Allocation (earlier, counseling) of students to seats in colleges is a key step in the admission
process from an institutional perspective. It decides the final fruit of all the hardships taken
by a candidate over years of schooling and special preparations for competitive examinations.
Importantly, this decision shapes the candidate’s future career. For better or for worse, currently
in the Indian system, seats are allocated based on marks obtained in competitive exams such
as the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE). A lot of care needs to be taken to ensure that the
appropriate seat is delivered to the candidate.
Until 2014, two different entrance examination-based methods were available for a candidate
to obtain a seat in undergraduate engineering disciplines offered by the Centrally Funded Tech-
nical Institutions (CFTI) including the Indian Institute of Technologies (IITs). The admissions
to the IITs were conducted under one umbrella, whereas the admissions to the non-IIT (CFTIs)
were conducted under a different umbrella, the Central Seat Allocation Board (CSAB). This
system resulted in an inefficient allocation.
Example 1. Consider an applicant Rohini who was assigned B.Sc. Chemistry in IIT Bombay
through her rank in the IIT JEE (Advanced) exam. She is unable to obtain her dream choice
of a B.Tech. program in Chemical Engineering at the National Institute of Technology (NIT),
Nagpur in the first round of counseling administered by CSAB (due to her relatively poorer
rank in her JEE Mains exam). While Rohini was offered Civil Engineering in NIT Silchar, she
rejected this offer from CSAB, and settled for the B.Sc. program at IIT Bombay.
For another candidate Bhavesh, it is the opposite. He is successful in getting B.Tech.,
Chemical Engg. at VNIT but, having a lower rank than Rohini in the JEE (Advanced), does not
get a seat in IIT Bombay. He decides to stay back in his home state of Gujarat and rejects the
VNIT seat and also elbows out a local candidate, Gurjar, in L.D. Engg. College, Ahmedabad.
In the subsequent rounds of CSAB allocation, Rohini is annoyed to find a candidate (with
marks lower than her own) allotted her favored Chemical Engg. seat at VNIT. Rohini realizes
that if she had accepted the Civil Engineering seat at NIT Silchar she would have obtained a
seat in VNIT in the final reckoning. In this process, she would have left a seat vacant in IIT
Bombay.
Meanwhile, recent high school graduate Gurjar, and most likely his parents, were trying to
get a train ticket to Assam in the hope of securing a civil engineering seat in Silchar in the
so-called spot round.
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Taking a step back, we observe that two different points of view need to be considered
to correctly allocate seats — the point of view of the candidates, and the point of view of
the participating institutions. All candidates should get the best available choice, and every
institution should fill all seats in the varying courses they offer. Consistent efforts have been
taken by different organizations in charge of counseling to satisfy both viewpoints.
Many institutions have grown to a stature of national importance. Each of them have their
own entrance examination for admission and also have a separate rank list and a separate
allocation process. Previously, the candidate filled a choice sheet for each of these institutions,
or sometimes, group of institutions. Thus, there was no provision in the past for the candidate
to list her choices in a single choice sheet across all institutions. Every choice sheet he filled
could indicate only the preferences of the candidate among available choices in the institution
he applies to. As a result, the candidate who filled K choice sheets may receive admission
to up to K programs from which he has to select one. However, as counseling dates are not
synchronized, and there is no legal provision for overbooking seats, the candidate may rationally
block more than one seat by paying required fees for safety reasons. At most one of these seats
is occupied by the candidate, whereas the remaining seats go vacant. As different allocation
processes have no mechanism to track this, many seats in unpopular (in the eyes of the young
candidates) courses end up being unfilled. At the same time, many candidates in the waiting
lists could not be admitted as the decision of the deserting candidates who have been allotted
a course is known only after the courses start and that becomes too late.
For better or for worse, overbooking of seats is not allowed by the authorities.
Different institutions and admission boards have tried different mechanisms to alleviate this
problem, which in our opinion are not very effective, leading to allocation inefficiency as well
as logistical difficulties for candidates and institutes. Some of these mechanisms are:
1. Spot admissions after classes begin: Many institutions do this admission within a very
short window of time. It becomes practically impossible for the candidates to move around
thousands of kilometers attending one spot round after another. Not only there are severe
logistical costs, there is also inappropriate allocation of seats.1
2. Penalty: When a candidate blocks a seat in a course the amount he pays may not be
refunded if he does not accept the admission offer; further the candidate may not be
allowed to write the entrance examination for the corresponding institution the next year.
Such penalties may be infeasible2 or may not be effective.
Solution
So what is the solution? Rather than passing the buck to the candidate, one can ask “Why
don’t the different admission bodies join together and solve the problem?” With this view
this document describes the details of a Joint Seat Allocation process. It has been success-
fully implemented since 2015. The participating institutes are IITs, NITs, and Other-GFTIs
(Government funded technical institutes.)
1In fact, in 2014 candidates holding a CSAB seat were not permitted to participate in the CSAB spot round
causing so-called rank violations.
2The courts have typically insisted on a full refund of fees.
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The process which we formulated conducts a single window multi-round counseling for
admissions to the Centrally Funded Technical Institutions (CFTI) based on the JEE (Main)
and JEE (Advanced) examination. Note that there are multiple sets of merit lists.3 We note
that each set comprises merit lists for the General (GEN) category, Other Backward Castes
Non-Creamy Layer (OBC-NCL) category, Scheduled Caste (SC) category, Scheduled Tribe (ST)
category, and Persons With Disability (PwD) category.4 The candidate fills only one choice
list indicating her choices from programs offered across all CFTIs. Thus, the admission bodies
get a global view of the choices and, in principle and practice, a better allocation [4] is possible
that incorporates both the candidate viewpoint and the institutional viewpoint.
We believe that the problem of a single window Joint Seat Allocation is non-trivial. In the
current context, we require a careful adaptation of existing methods based on the celebrated
Deferred Acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley [7, 9, 1]. Our scheme is truthful, namely the
scheme makes it safe/optimal for each candidate to report her true preferences over programs in
her submitted choice list. The seat allocation produced does not waste seats and is fair/stable
in the sense that it does not give a seat to a lower ranked candidate that was denied to a higher
ranked candidate. Further, the allocation is optimal in a formal sense, providing each candidate
with the best possible seat subject to fairness. See Section 2.2 for formal definitions.
With the implementation of this scheme in the last 4 years, the joint seat allocation has led
to a substantial reduction in vacancies in the IITs quantified in [4]. The reduction in vacancies
in CSAB institutes have been more modest. We discuss methods to minimize these vacancies
in [4].
1.1 Organization of the report
Chapter 2 presents the problem formally along with introducing some basic notations and ter-
minologies to be used in the rest of the report. Chapter 3 first presents the deferred acceptance
(DA) algorithm in its simplest form. Later it describes the version that handles two impor-
tant aspects of multiple rounds, namely, Min-Cutoff and multiple candidates with the same
rank. Chapter 4 describes some fundamental business rules for admissions into three types of
institutes, and how they are incorporated using virtual programs and virtual preference tables.
Chapter 5 presents the complete description of the multiple round DA algorithm. Chapter 6
presents the way de-reservation is handled in each round by executing multiple runs of our
algorithm. In view of this consideration, we term our scheme as MRDA, a multi-run deferred
acceptance scheme. Chapter 7 presents the adaptation of the rule of supernumerary seats for
females. In Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, we conclude with a brief summary of the impact of joint
seat allocation in the last 4 years along with the recommendations for future years.
Finally, in Chapter 10, which is the Appendix, we provide the details of the following aspects
of the MRDA algorithm and Joint Seat Allocation 2018:
1. A key requirement, that of increasing the ratio of females to males, cropped up in 2018.
While Chapter 7 introduces the constraints, and provides our algorithm, first look alter-
3Different merit lists need not have any relationship with each other. They may or may not be based on the
same set of examinations.
4While the existence of these categories is significant, the definitions (or rationale) of these categories are
outside the scope of this document.
3
native algorithms that have significant drawbacks are listed in the appendix for a better
understanding of the nuances.
2. A summary of the activities at the reporting center during a round that influences the
seat allocation of the next round.
3. Survey questions that are asked when a candidate refuses a seat
4. Validation modules required to ensure that the seat allocation produced meets all business
rules.
5. Implementation details of MRDA.
6. The changes in the business rules of the joint seat allocation since 2015.
7. Implementation details of a 2015 business rule that we believe may be interesting to
practitioners elsewhere.
8. History and background of the admission process to engineering colleges in India.
9. The challenge and opportunity of overbooking seats to reduce vacancies
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Background and Challenges
In the case of a single merit list, candidates are sequentially ordered, and the allotment of seats
is done by processing candidates in the same order and allowing each candidate to choose from
among the seats that are still available.1 For example, consider three candidates, A, B and C.
If in the NIT merit list, they are ranked as A, B and C, then, given the choices of A, B and C
for different branches, we give preference to A over B and C. Likewise, we give preference to B
over C. The allotment process first allocates a seat to A, then to B, and finally to C.
In practice, the process is much more intricate as one has to take care of various categories
like GEN, OBC-NCL, SC, ST, PwD, their cut-offs, and then recouping of unallocated OBC-NCL
and PwD seats. Nevertheless, a solution can, and has been devised.
Unfortunately, if we have multiple merit lists, the issues are much more complex. Consider
a simple scenario of three merit lists, namely those of the IITs, the NITs and a merit list for the
Architecture (ARCH) program in which an additional examination needs to be cleared. Again
consider our 3 candidates, A, B and C. Let the three merit lists be as follows:
NIT merit List: (1, A), (2, B) and (3, C) (as mentioned earlier)
IIT Merit List: (1, B), (2, C), and (3, A)
ARCH merit List: (1, C), (2, A) and (3, B)
Note that now, unlike in the case of a single merit list, there is no overall strict ordering
among A, B and C as their relative performance is different in the three examinations. In
practice, we may have several merit lists covering tens of examinations and lakhs of candidates.
Now consider a joint seat allocation process where each candidate fills up a single choice
sheet. An example is shown below where we assume, for illustration, that there is only a single
seat available in each program.
A: 1: IIT, 2: ARCH, 3: NIT
1This is known as serial dictatorship in the literature [10].
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B: 1: ARCH, 2: NIT, 3: IIT
C: 1: NIT, 2: IIT, 3: ARCH
Note that the choices of the candidates are their personal preferences and may not have any
linkages to their relative ranks in different merit lists.
How do we allocate seats? The first condition that comes to one’s mind is fairness.
Fairness may appear straightforward: A candidate’s choice for a program should be honored
in the order of merit for that program. In the example, since candidate B does express a
preference to go to NIT, it should never be the case that any candidate in the NIT merit list
worse than B displaces B, and denies B a seat; B may however be given a seat which she prefers
to NIT, say ARCH.
Given multiple merit lists, there may be several solutions for the same choices that satisfy
fairness. Consider three different allocations:
Allocation 1: A (NIT), B (IIT), C (ARCH)
Allocation 2: A (ARCH), B(NIT), C (IIT)
Allocation 3: A (IIT), B (ARCH), C (NIT)
Allocation 1 is fair because A is ranked first in NIT merit list, B is ranked first in IIT merit
list and C is ranked first in ARCH merit list. But Allocation 1 gives each candidate their worst
choice. In fact, should A and B meet each other, they would be willing to swap their allocation!
Allocation 2 is also fair, and better from the candidate’s point of view than Allocation 1 because
it gives everyone their second choice. Finally, Allocation 3 is also fair, and better than both
Allocations 1 and 2 from the candidate’s point of view because everyone gets their first choice.
This brings about the following scientific question, given that fairness is not good enough.
Is there a “best” choice among the different available fair allocations, and how can
one compute it?
We have highlighted these questions through a simple scenario. The solution gets compli-
cated when we have the practical situations of lakhs of candidates having to fill a common
choice list over multiple merit lists where each institution have their own business rules in the
handling of state and central SC/ST/OBC-NCL/PwD categories, multi-session allocation, and
spot allocations.2
This document presents details of design, analysis and implementation of a scalable solution
to the problem mentioned above.
2In the simple case with no categories, [7] shows that there is a unique candidate optimal fair allocation,
which simultaneously gives each candidate their best possible fair allocation. Further, this allocation can be
computed using the candidate-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
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2.2 Formal Problem Statement
We start with a simplified problem with multiple merit lists for the different programs3. Differing
programs may have the same merit list, or may have different merit lists. As discussed earlier,
the problem is complex, but we term it ‘simplified’ for now because (for example) there are no
quotas or ties in the presentation of this section.
Let P be the set of programs For a program p ∈ P, let c(p) denote the number of seats
in p. Let A denote the set of applicants (or candidates), with A = |A| being the number
of candidates. Each candidate is allowed only one seat in the system. Candidates are asked
to submit a choice (or preference) list over programs; the choice list is a strictly ordered list
containing any subset of the programs in P.
We denote the preference list of candidate x by
Pref(x) = px,1, px,2, . . . , px,n(x) (2.1)
which means that candidate x has listed n(x) programs, with program px,1 being her top choice,
program px,2 being her next choice and so on. The candidate is asked to list only programs she
is interested in.
Each program must submit its capacity c(p), as well as its merit list of candidates, which is
a strictly ordered list containing a subset of the candidates in A. We denote the merit list of
program p by
Merit(p) = xp,1, xp,2, . . . , xp,m(p) (2.2)
which means that program p has ranked m(p) candidates in its merit list, with candidate xp,1
ranked 1, candidate xp,2 being ranked 2, and so on.
Let µ(x) ∈ P be the program allotted to candidate x by some mechanism, with some
candidates possibly not getting any seat, in which case we write µ(x) = φ. Denote the overall
allocation by µ¯ = (µ(x))x∈A. We want a mechanism with the following properties:
1. Fairness: Suppose candidate x is allotted program p. Then for any other candidate y such
that y has a better (smaller) rank than candidate x in the merit list of p, the allocation
of y should be p or some other program that y prefers to p.4
Further, the mechanism must ensure that a candidate is not allotted a program that she
did not list, and that no program is allotted to a candidate that was not a part of the
merit list of the program.5
2. Optimality: There does not exist any other allocation µ¯′ that satisfies the Fairness prop-
erty, and provides any candidate x with an allocation she prefers to µ(x) based on her
preference list.
3. Truthfulness: The mechanism must make it optimal for candidates to report their true
preferences.
A priori it is unclear that a mechanism satisfying all these properties exists. However, it
turns out that such a mechanism does exist, and was constructed by Gale and Shapley. [7]).
3One may view the word ‘program’, ‘course’, ‘branch’ and ‘programme’ interchangeably in the rest of the
document. For ease of understanding at this stage, one may think of a program as a college having a single
course, say, Electrical Engineering in IIT Kharagpur.
4This property is called stability in the literature [7].
5This property is called individual rationality in the literature [10].
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2.3 Previous Work
An initial solution to the simplified problem was proposed by Gale and Shapley in 1962 [7] by
formulating it as a “Stable marriage problem”. The proposed solution was shown to have a mul-
titude of desirable properties including fairness and candidate optimality [7], and truthfulness
[6] (no candidate or group of candidates can benefit from misreporting their preferences). The
Gale and Shapley mechanism has been adapted and implemented successfully in a multitude of
real world settings, e.g., the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) (running in the
USA since 1951, redesigned in 1999 [9]), New York City high school admissions since 2003 [1],
and school and college admissions in Hungary [5].
However, our problem involves a variety of business rules governing flows of different systems
that need to be streamlined for evolving a sound process of common allocation. We need to
suitably adapt the Gale-Shapley mechanism to incorporate these business rules while retaining
all these desirable properties. In the sequel, we demonstrate these and come up with a practical
algorithm.
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Chapter 3
A Combined Seat Allocation Scheme
Our proposed mechanism first collects information from the participating programs and candi-
dates. It then uses this information to produce an allocation of seats.
3.1 Initial Information collection
Each participating program provides two pieces of information:
• The capacity c(p), i.e., the number of available seats
• A merit list of eligible candidates (Equation 2.2). The purpose of a merit list of program
is to compare two candidates. For implementation of the algorithm, it is quite possible
that this merit list is not explicitly computed. Instead, the relative order of any two
candidates can be determined from the information associated with each of them (marks,
birth category, PwD status).
Each candidate (who is eligible for at least one program) enters a preference list (Equa-
tion 2.1) of programs for which she is eligible, with the first entry being her most preferred
program, the next entry being her next most preferred program, and so on.
We now describe the algorithm for allocating programs to candidates which incorporates
all the business rules (see Chapter 4), and has three properties, namely, fairness, candidate-
optimality, and truthfulness.
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm that forms the core of the joint allocation is
described in the following section.
3.2 Basic DA algorithm
We stress that in the DA algorithm, “applications”, insertions into “waitlists” and “rejections”
mentioned are all merely part of the algorithm, and do not actually involve any participation
from the candidates and programs in the real world. That is, the algorithm internally generates
applications, using the information that the candidates and programs have provided. We now
state the algorithm in words. See Section 3.3 for the complete pseudocodes.
Input:
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• For each program, its capacity and the rank list of eligible candidates.
• For each candidate, a preference list of programs.
Algorithm:
1. All candidates apply (in any order) to the first program in their preference list.
2. Each program p considers the applications it has received. Applications from candidates
who are not eligible are immediately dropped. Let the capacity of the program be c(p) > 0.
If the program has received c(p) or fewer eligible applications, then it retains all candidates
on a waitlist. Otherwise, it ranks the candidates making these requests (as per the merit
list of the program) and retains only the c(p) best candidates on its waitlist, and rejects
other candidates.
If no rejections are made by any program, the algorithm terminates.
3. Only rejected candidates apply (in any order) to the next program on their list, if any,
and the algorithm returns to Step 2.
If not even a single application is generated, then the algorithm terminates.
Output: When the algorithm terminates, the (final) “wait list” for each program p constitutes
candidates admitted to program p.
We present complete details of the DA algorithm through pseudocode in the following
sections.
3.3 Pseudocode
Denote rank of candidate x with respect to Merit(p) by Rank(x, p). For a list l, denote the
number of entries in the list by Length(l).
We narrate two versions of the pseudocode. In the first version, the assumption is that the
entire seat allocation happens in a single round and all candidates in a merit list have distinct
ranks. It is presented to understand the general flow of the algorithm. The second version gets
rid of this assumption, and is for multi-round scenarios as described in Chapter 5. In particular,
it handles two non-trivial issues (i) there may be multiple candidates with the same rank, (ii)
the credentials of candidates, and thus relative ordering, may change between rounds.
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Algorithm 1 Deferred Acceptance Simple Version
INPUT:
Candidates A, Programs P
Preference list Pref(x) for each x ∈ A
Capacity c(p) and merit list Merit(p) for each p ∈ P
OUTPUT:
For each candidate x ∈ A, the allocation µ(x) ∈ P ∪ {∅}
Also for each program p ∈ P, the list of admitted candidates WaitList(p)
1: for all p ∈ P do
2: Create an empty ordered list WaitList(p) that will consist of
3: candidates ordered by their rank in Merit(p)
4: end for
5: Create an empty queue Q
6: for all x ∈ A do
7: i(x)← 1 . Initialize list position to 1.
8: if Length(Pref(x)) > 0 then
9: Enqueue(x,Q) . x enters queue Q
10: end if
11: end for
12: while Q is non-empty do
13: x← Dequeue(Q) . x is any candidate removed from queue Q
14: p← px,i(x) . x applies to program px,i(x)
15: if x is not eligible for p then
16: Reject(x)
17: continue
18: end if
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19: if Length(WaitList(p)) = c(p) then . The waitlist is full
20: y ← Last candidate in WaitList(p)
21: if Rank(x, p) < Rank(y, p) then
22: Remove y from WaitList(p)
23: Reject(y)
24: Insert x into ordered list WaitList(p) at correct location
25: else
26: Reject(x)
27: end if
28: else
29: Insert x into ordered list WaitList(p) at correct location
30: end if
31: end while
32: for all x ∈ A do
33: if px,i(x) exists in Pref(x) then
34: µ(x)← px,i(x)
35: else
36: µ(x)← ∅
37: end if
38: end for
39: return µ(x) for all x ∈ A and WaitList(p) for all p ∈ P
40:
41: function Reject(x)
42: Increment i(x)
43: if px,i(x) exists in Pref(x) then . x wants to apply further
44: Enqueue(x,Q) . x enters queue Q again
45: end if
46: end function
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3.3.1 Multi-Round Scenario
Many candidates who obtain seats in the first round of seat allocation will surrender or reject
their respective seats at a later stage. In order to utilize these surrendered seats, the business
rules allow multiple rounds of seat allocation. We now present Algorithm 2 that incorporates
the following two issues — the first issue arises due to multiple round and the second issue
arises due to multiple candidates with same rank competing for a program.1
• Seat guarantee in future rounds.
Credentials (such as birth category, or qualifying marks) of candidates may change (due
to faulty reporting) during future rounds. In some cases, fresh candidates become eligible
to participate between rounds. In such situations, we need to provide seat guarantee
to candidates who were allotted a seat in an earlier round. We introduce the idea of
Min-Cutoff(p) for each p ∈ P: this quantity is used in second and later rounds of
allocation (see Chapter 5 for details). Intuitively, a candidate with rank better than, or
as good as Min-Cutoff(p) will never be rejected by p regardless of the capacity of p.
Candidates offered a seat in the first round will thus be no worse off in subsequent rounds.
As alluded above, there might be new candidates who become eligible for seat allocation
in subsequent rounds2.
• Multiple candidates with equal rank.
Suppose multiple candidates obtain exactly the same rank. In the situation when we are
forced to reject some candidate due to the possibility that the program is oversubscribed,
we have to also reject (and remove) all other candidates in the waiting list who also have
the same rank. This may not be always possible.
We carry out suitable modifications as stated in Algorithm 2 to allow such candidates
to obtain seats in the program on a supernumerary basis. We keep WaitList(p) fully
ordered at each step, by choosing an arbitrary order between candidates in WaitList(p)
who have the exact same rank as per Merit(p).
There are two concepts involved here. First, when an attempt is made to remove a
candidate x, a removal of all candidates with the same rank of x may cause the waitlist
which is initially overflowing, to now underflow. To identify this situation, we compute
the length G of the waitlist, and the length L of the list of candidates all of whom have
the same rank as x. If the difference between the two exceeds or matches the capacity,
we are free to remove all such candidates. Second, if this condition is not satisfied, it is
not possible to remove all candidates with rank of x.
The pseudocode of Algorithm 2 allows for additional optional inputs in order to implement
second and later rounds of seat allocation. In Chapter 4, we show how various business rules
of IITs and NITs (such as handling quotas, supernumerary seats for DS candidates, etc.) can
be incorporated seamlessly in this algorithm. The full description of how to use Algorithm 2 to
implement the seat allocation in each round is provided in Chapter 5.
1In 2015, similar issues had more complicated business rules; see [3] severely complicating the algorithm.
2For example, a candidate might be ineligible for joint seat allocation earlier due to less board marks, but
may become eligible in subsequent round if her board marks increase after re-evaluation. In such cases, the
allocated seat shall be what the candidate would have got on the basis of the revised rank in the first round.
This seat can be a supernumerary seat.
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Algorithm 2 Deferred Acceptance (Full version allowing multiple rounds and multiple candi-
dates with the same rank)
INPUTS:
Candidates A, Programs P
For each x ∈ A:
Preference list Pref(x)
Optional input: integer i(x). Default value i(x) = 1. (Start from beginning of preference
list by default.)
For each p ∈ P:
Capacity c(p) and merit list Merit(p).
Optional input: WaitList(p).
Optional input: Min-Cutoff(p). 0 by default.
Optional input: Q a queue of candidates. By default contains all candidates x with
Length(Pref(x)) > 0.
OUTPUTS:
For each candidate x ∈ A, the allocation µ(x) ∈ P ∪ {∅} and i(x).
Also for each program p ∈ P, the list of admitted candidates WaitList(p)
1: for all p ∈ P do
2: Create an empty ordered list WaitList(p) that will consist of
3: candidates ordered by their rank in Merit(p)
4: end for
5: Create an empty queue Q
6: for all x ∈ A do
7: i(x)← 1 . Initialize list position to 1.
8: if Length(Pref(x)) > 0 then
9: Enqueue(x,Q) . x enters queue Q
10: end if
11: end for
12: while Q is non-empty do
13: x← Dequeue(Q) . x is any candidate removed from queue Q
14: p← px,i(x) . x applies to program px,i(x)
15: if x is not eligible for p OR c(p) = 0 then
16: Reject(x)
17: continue . move to next person in Q
18: end if
19: Insert x into ordered list WaitList(p) at correct location
20: if Length(WaitList(p)) ≤ c(p) then continue . space in program
21: end if
22: y ← Last candidate in WaitList(p)
23: if rank(y)>MinCutOff(p) then RemoveAndReject(y, p)
24: end if
25: end while
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26: for all x ∈ A do
27: if i(x) ≤ Length(Pref(x)) then
28: µ(x)← px,i(x)
29: else . x reached the end of her list
30: µ(x)← ∅
31: end if
32: end for
33: return µ(x), i(x) for all x ∈ A and WaitList(p) for all p ∈ P
34: function Reject(x) . The function is assumed to have access to i(x), Pref(x), Q
35: Increment i(x)
36: if i(x) ≤ Length(Pref(x)) then . x wants to apply further
37: Enqueue(x,Q) . x enters queue Q again
38: end if
39: end function
40: function RemoveAndReject(w, p)
41: G← |WaitList(p)|
42: L← number of people with rank same as w . L is at least 1
43: if (G− L) ≥ c(p) then
44: for all x ∈WaitList(p) with Rank(x, p) = Rank(w, p) do
45: Remove x from WaitList(p)
46: Reject(x)
47: end for
48: end if
49: end function
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Chapter 4
Business Rules
As discussed earlier, the Government of India recognizes quotas for certain birth categories. In
general, a candidate applies for a program rather than for a seat in a particular category; she
may be eligible for multiple seat categories. The so-called business rules [8] describe how to
allocate seats in such scenarios. In this and subsequent sections, we describe how these rules
are to be incorporated into the proposed algorithm. The following is a broad classification of
the variety in allocation.
1. Allocations based on reservations based on birth-categories.
2. Allocations for persons with disabilities (PwD).
3. Allocations for candidates who are not nationals of India (International students). This
particular section applies only to the IITs.
4. Allocations for certain children of military personnel killed in military operations (DS
candidates). This particular section applies only to the IITs.
5. Allocations for candidates who fail to clear certain minimum thresholds but can be
groomed for admission a year later (preparatory course (PC) candidates). This particular
section applies only to the IITs.
6. Allocations based on reservations on the residency state of a candidate. This particular
section does not apply to the IITs.
7. Allocations based on de-reservation of seats.
8. Allocations incorporating the rule of supernumerary seats for female candidates.
Allocations based on de-reservation of seats (Item 7), is presented in full details in Chap-
ter 6. Allocation incorporating the rule of supernumerary seats for female candidates (Item
8) is presented in Chapter 7. In the current chapter we describe how our DA algorithm can
incorporate Items 1-6.
4.1 Incorporating Quotas
We first consider the important cases of 1-2 above.
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4.1.1 Virtual programs
All candidates, irrespective of their respective categories, declare programs in the decreasing
order of preference. However, internally we introduce virtual programs based on the quota for
each category. Each virtual program will be associated with a merit list constructed out of
rank lists (which in turn is based on marks obtained in the exam). Each candidate will now
be associated with a virtual preference list. The concept of virtual programs, together with
virtual merit lists and virtual preference lists for candidates is the suggested way for handling
the majority of business rules.
There are 8 virtual programs for each actual program as per Table 4.1. The DS virtual
program for the IITs is considered later (Section 4.3).
OPEN OBC-NCL SC ST
OPEN-PwD OBC-NCL-PwD SC-PwD ST-PwD
Table 4.1: Candidates are partitioned into categories and assigned a tag. A candidate can
possess only one of these 8 tags. Further, for each actual program, there is a separate virtual
program corresponding to each of these 8 categories.
4.1.2 Virtual Preference List
The sequence of seat allocation mentioned in Rule VII of [8] are very important. These are
given in Figure 4.1 and merit careful consideration.1 For example, the sixth row states that for
an OBC-NCL candidate with PwD tag, we try to fill the OPEN seats before any other seat,
failing which we consider the OPEN-PwD seat before venturing into OBC-NCL seats.
Category PD Status
GEN N OP
OBC N OP > OBC
SC N OP > SC
ST N OP > ST
GEN Y OP > OP-PD
OBC Y OP > OP-PD > OBC > OBC-PD
SC Y OP > OP-PD > SC   > SC-PD
ST Y OP > OP-PD > ST   > ST-PD
Preference List
Figure 4.1: Virtual preference list for candidates when quotas are involved.
1In this and all further preference tables, OP, OBC and PD are used instead of OPEN, OBC-NCL and PwD
respectively. That is, OP refers to OPEN, OBC refers to OBC-NCL, OBC-PD refers to OBC-NCL-PwD, etc.
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4.1.3 Virtual Merit Lists
Standard Rank Lists How does one decide on which candidate to award a seat if there are
competing candidates for a program? Associated with each virtual program is a merit list
constructed from ranks provided by various examinations.
Quoting rule VI from [8] the following TYPES of rank lists will be prepared based on
pre-defined cut-offs:
1. Common rank list (CRL): It includes candidates who are assigned the tag GEN, GEN-
PwD, OBC-NCL, OBC-NCL-PwD, SC, SC-PwD, ST or ST- PwD. Foreign nationals are
also included in the CRL prepared based on JEE (Advanced) 2018.
2. OBC-NCL rank list: It includes candidates who are assigned the tag OBC-NCL or OBC-
NCL-PwD.
3. SC rank list: It includes candidates who are assigned the tag SC or SC-PwD.
4. ST rank list: It includes candidates who are assigned the tag ST or ST-PwD.
5. CRL-PwD rank list: It includes candidates who are assigned the tag GEN-PwD, OBC-
NCL-PwD, SC-PwD or ST-PwD.
6. OBC-NCL-PwD rank list: It includes candidates who are assigned the tag OBC-NCL-
PwD.
7. SC-PwD rank list: It includes candidates who are assigned the tag SC-PwD.
8. ST-PwD rank list: It includes candidates who are assigned the tag ST-PwD.
Once rank lists are available, the rules for allocation for various seat categories are specified
in Rule VII of [8].
In each virtual queue, candidates with differing tags are eligible to participate. Thus in the
OPEN virtual programs, we can find candidates with different categories from Table 4.1. The
virtual merit list encodes the order of consideration for seats in each program.
4.1.4 Preparatory courses allocation
The notion of PC (Item 5 at the beginning of Chapter 4) for the IITs, will, however, uncover
why only the standard merit lists are not sufficient in allocating seats. Quoting Rule XI of [8]
we have the rules for seat allocation to preparatory courses applicable for every round.
1. Unfilled OPEN-PwD seats will be allocated to candidates in the CRL-PwD preparatory
rank list subject to no more candidates in the CRL-PwD rank list having opted for them.
2. Unfilled OBC-NCL-PwD seats will be allocated to candidates in the OBC-NCL-PwD
preparatory rank list subject to no more candidates in the OBC-NCL-PwD rank list
having opted for them.
3. Unfilled SC-PwD seats will be allocated to candidates in the SC-PwD preparatory rank
list subject to no more candidates in the SC-PwD rank list having opted for them.
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4. Unfilled ST-PwD seats will be allocated to candidates in the ST-PwD preparatory rank
list subject to no more candidates in the ST-PwD rank list having opted for them.
5. Unfilled SC seats will be allocated to candidates in the SC preparatory rank list subject
to no more candidates in the SC rank list have opted for them.
6. Unfilled ST seats will be allocated to candidates in the ST preparatory rank list subject
to no more candidates in the ST rank list have opted for them.
In order to allot seats to PC candidates, preparatory rank lists may be prepared. This leads
us to the following definition.
Definition 2. We construct the extended merit list for any virtual program, cf. Table 4.1, by
taking the standard rank list followed by the corresponding preparatory course (PC) rank list if
• such a list has been prepared, and
• the corresponding preparatory course exists.
Up to six lists are possible: PC-CRL-PwD, PC-OBC-NCL-PwD, PC-SC, PC-SC-PwD, PC-
ST, PC-ST-PwD. In each case, if the PC list is prepared, it is included as part of the extended
merit list for the parent category: e.g., if the PC-SC rank list is prepared, the virtual merit list
for SC courses (in institutes that have PC courses) will include the SC rank list followed by the
PC-SC rank list. This will automatically lead to unfilled seats being offered to PC candidates.
Note that the PC rank lists do not have any commonality with the standard rank lists, i.e., a
candidate in PC rank list will not appear in any standard rank list.
In summary, at this juncture, in the case no PC exists for a program (as is the case of the
NITs), the virtual merit list of a virtual program is identical to the corresponding standard rank
list. On the other hand, if PC courses are present, the virtual merit list of a virtual program is
identical to the extended merit list.
Later on, we will see more complex virtual merit lists.
4.1.5 Updated Algorithm: DA With Quotas
Armed with virtual programs, virtual merit lists corresponding to virtual programs, and virtual
preferences, we now explicitly construct the internal preference list for each candidate.
Example 3. Consider a candidate with category tag SC-PwD, who is eligible for both the SC
virtual program, and the SC-PwD virtual program. This candidate has not cleared the cutoff
specified for OPEN seat. Then for each IIT program p in the preference list of the candidate, we
instantiate the virtual preference from Figure 4.1 by excluding the OPEN option, and considering
only the three other options corresponding to row 7.
Algorithm 2 is run for each round based on the construction of the virtual preference list
for all candidates, and extended merit list for each virtual program.
It is important to note that by modifying the virtual preference tables, the standard DA
with quotas can be applied based on variations in business rules on how quotas should be
administered when, for example, unfilled seats are found.
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4.2 DA with International Students
The business rules for the IITs specify that international candidates can be admitted to programs
in IITs through supernumerary seats subject to the following constraints.
1. Eligibility: The candidate (with international student credentials) must have a valid rank
in CRL and satisfy all the eligibility requirements meant for a GEN category candidate.
Furthermore, such a candidate is eligible for a program if her rank is not worse than
the rank of the worst rank Indian candidate in OPEN category getting admitted to that
program. However, if there is any OPEN seat lying vacant in a program, then every
international candidate is eligible for that program.
2. As per rules, the total number of international allocations must not exceed 10% of the
total allocations in an academic program. However, each IIT may choose to restrict the
seats for such candidates to any number below 10% in some, or all programs. There is a
separate seat matrix provided by IITs for international candidates each year. This seat
matrix is provided as input along with the usual seat matrix which is meant for Indian
(i.e., non-international) students.
In order to incorporate this business rule, we proceed as follows. First, corresponding to each
OPEN program, we introduce a virtual program for international candidates, with a capacity
decided by each institute. Next, we compute the seat allocation only for Indian candidates using
Algorithm 2. Then we process all international candidates. In order to satisfy the eligibility
criteria mentioned in Item 1 above, we replace lines 15 to lines 18 in Algorithm 2 by the following
code. Here OPEN(p) is the OPEN virtual program for Indian candidates corresponding to the
international virtual program p.
1: if c(p) = 0 then
2: Reject(x)
3: continue
4: end if
5: if Length(WaitList(OPEN(p))) ≥ c(OPEN(p)) then . OPEN(p) had no vacancy
6: y ← Last Indian candidate in WaitList(OPEN(p))
7: if Rank(x, p) > Rank(y, p) then . x has inferior rank than y
8: Reject(x)
9: continue
10: end if
11: end if
4.3 DA with candidates from defense service quota
The business rule specifies that DS (defense services) candidates should be given the best
program they prefer in an IIT subject to the constraint that there are only 2 seats for DS
candidates per IIT. Moreover, these seats will be supernumerary seats. Note that for a DS
candidate to be eligible for virtual DS program, she must have a valid rank in CRL.
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4.3.1 Incorporating the business rule for DS candidates
To implement the rule, a new virtual DS program with capacity 2 is created for each IIT,
namely IITK-DS, IITB-DS, IITR-DS, and so on. Only DS candidates are eligible for this
virtual program. Furthermore, the preference list of each DS candidate is modified as follows.
If the preference list of the DS candidate is 〈p1, p2, p3〉, then her preference list will first be
modified as 〈p1, Institute(p1), p2, Institute(p2),p3, Institute(p3)〉, where Institute(pi) is the DS
virtual program created for the IIT corresponding to pi. For example, if pi is a program in IIT
Roorkee, then Institute(pi) is IITR-DS. Then p1 (likewise p2, p3) will be replaced as usual by the
list of virtual programs of p1 for which the DS candidate is eligible based on the birth category
and PwD status. This ensures that each DS candidate first competes to get a program of some
IIT based on birth category and PwD status, and only after that, she competes (based on rank
in CRL) to get that program through DS rule. DS candidates admitted to, for example, the
IITR-DS virtual program, are allotted a supernumerary seat in their most preferred program
at IIT Roorkee.
4.4 DA for Admission into IITs, NITs, and other GFTIs
In Section 4.1.5 we have seen the standard DA with quotas which is applicable to all central
government funded institutions. Further, we have seen various business rules, and how the core
algorithm is modified to take care of various business rules. In this section we summarize the
process of allocation.
4.4.1 Virtual Preference Table for IITs
Business Rule items 1-5 and items 7 & 8 from the list at the beginning of Chapter 4 apply. To
include PC candidates, Figure 4.1 is modified slightly and is presented in Figure 4.2.
Notice that, as compared to Fig. 4.1, there are new types of categories in the last six rows,
and the extended merit list comes into play. We may use the Standard DA algorithm with
quotas (Section 4.1.5) with the discussions so far in Sec. 4.2, and Sec. 4.3 if only seats in the
IITs are offered.
In reality, a candidate may be eligible to apply for many programs across multiple insti-
tutions beyond the IITs. The virtual preference lists need to be considered in an appropriate
fashion, depending on whether a program is in the IITs or not. The next two sections describe
the process for NITs and other GFTIs.
4.4.2 Virtual Preference Table for NITs
All items in the beginning of Chapter 4 apply, except Items 3,4, and 5. There are, however,
additional qualifiers corresponding to Item 6. We focus on Item 6. Seats for academic programs
offered by NITs are divided into Home State quota and Other States quota. These additional
quotas are reflected in the virtual preference table as shown in Figure 4.3, and do not change
the core of the algorithm.
Example 4. As an example, consider the virtual preference list for an OBC-NCL-PwD person
whose “Home State” is Maharashtra. He may express a preference to apply to the electrical
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Category PD Status
GEN N OP
OBC N OP > OBC
SC N OP > SC
ST N OP > ST
GEN Y OP > OP-PwD
OBC Y OP > OP-PwD > OBC > OBC-PwD
SC Y OP > OP-PwD > SC > SC-PwD
ST Y OP > OP-PwD > ST >
PC(SC) N SC
PC(ST) N ST
PC(SC) Y OP-PwD > SC > SC-PwD
PC(ST) Y OP-PwD > ST> ST-PwD
PC(OBC) Y OP-PwD > OBC-PwD
PC(GE) Y OP-PwD
Preference List
Figure 4.2: Virtual preference list for candidates when PC candidates are involved.
engineering program of NIT in this state, viz., the NIT in Nagpur. In this case, her virtual
preference will be represented by the sixth row in the table. If her next preference is the electrical
engineering program of the NIT in Tamil Nadu, then the virtual preference will be read from the
14th row of the table and he will not be eligible for the Home State quota of the NIT in Tamil
Nadu. Finally, if her next preference is the electrical engineering program in IIT Roorkee, Item
6 does not apply; we refer back to the sixth row in Figure 4.2.
4.4.3 Virtual Preference Table for Other GFTIs
For Government Funded Technical Institutions (GFTIs) other than the IITs and the NITs, all
items in the beginning of Chapter 4 except for Items 3,4, and 5 apply. On the basis of the
existence of quotas based on the residency state of a candidate, there are the following three
types of other GFTIs and their respective virtual preference tables.
1. All India (AI) quota: If a GFTI has only AI quota, then the virtual preference table is
the same as the one shown in Figure 4.1. All Indian Institutes of Information Technology
(IIITs) have AI quota only. Other examples of GFTIs that have only AI quota are School
of Planning & Architecture, Bhopal and Gurukula Kangri Vishwavidyalaya, Haridwar.
2. Home State (HS) and Other State (OS) quota: If a GFTI has HS and OS quota, then the
virtual preference table is the same as that for NITs (shown in Figure 4.3). BITS Mesra
is one such GFTI that follows the HS/OS quota model.
3. Home State (HS) and All India (AI) quota: The virtual preference table for such GFTIs
is shown in Figure 4.4. Currently Assam university, Silchar is the only GFTI institute
having HS and AI quota.
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As an example, consider the virtual preference list for a ST-PwD person whose “Home
State” is Assam. She may express a preference to apply to the mechanical engineering program
of Assam University Silchar. In this case, her virtual preference list for this program will
be represented by the ST-PwD row (the eighth row) in the table shown in Figure 4.4. Let us
consider an OBC-NCL-PwD candidate whose Home State is not Assam. If one of her preference
is a program in the Assam University Silchar, then the virtual preference list for this program
will be read from the fourteenth row of the table shown in Figure 4.4. Note that not only
will she be ineligible for the seats in the Home State quota of this university, she will also be
competing for seats from All India quota with candidates whose home state is Assam.
4.4.4 Summary
The core algorithm is the standard DA algorithm with quotas. However, the virtual preference
lists must be correctly constructed based on the programs a candidate applies to, and the tag she
has. Once virtual programs, virtual preference lists, and virtual merit lists are constructed, the
algorithm is applied for all candidates in the pool, including the PC candidates, DS candidates,
international students, as well as the remaining bulk of candidates who do not belong to these
special cases.
Note that the business rules involve complex de-reservation. As such, in order to complete
the allocation, de-reservation as per business rules must be employed on top of the process
described so far. Chapter 6 is devoted to handling de-reservation in a holistic way. Starting
from 2018, the rule of supernumerary seats for females has also been introduced. We discuss it
in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 5
Multi-round Implementation
Allocation of seats is conducted over multiple rounds for a variety of reasons, including the
reality that offered seats may not be accepted, and overbooking of seats is not permitted. As
introduced in Section 3.3.1, the notion of fairness becomes complicated since new candidates
may join the seat requisition process. Second and later rounds facilitate the utilization of surren-
dered seats, including the possibility of awarding a surrendered open category seat to a person
earlier denied such an open seat, and earlier awarded a seat in a particular restricted quota.
To maintain truthfulness, fairness, and optimality across rounds requires careful algorithmic
design.
After initial information collection (Section 3.1) our algorithm proceeds in rounds with the
following activities taking place in each round.
1. We execute the algorithm described in Section 4.4 using Algorithm 2 with the candidates
initiating applications (proposing to the programs in the decreasing order of their pref-
erences). Such an execution is termed as a run of the algorithm. The seat allocation
computed by the algorithm is announced to the candidates.
2. A candidate who is allotted a program is required to go physically to a reporting center for
document verification and seat confirmation in the program. There, the candidate may
also exercise the options ‘freeze’, ‘float’, or ‘slide’ for future rounds. These options are
described in more details later. A candidate who accepts a program may also surrender her
seat and withdraw from the joint seat allocation later in the same round or any subsequent
round before the withdrawal deadline 1. It is also possible that after document verification,
the credentials of the candidate change which may potentially lead to the cancellation of
the seat of the candidate. A candidate may reject the offered seat; rejection is implicit
if the candidate does not report. Candidates who reject a seat do not participate in the
process thereafter.
3. Based on the activities at the reporting center, inputs for the next round of seat allocation
is updated.
1Withdrawal was allowed till the sixth round in 2018.
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5.1 MRDA
The process described in Steps 1–3 is summarized in Figure 5.1 and it constitutes the Multi
Round Deferred Acceptance scheme. The process mentioned here does not take care of de-
reservation which is addressed in Chapter 6. In brief, in de-reservation, multiple runs of the
algorithm in Step 1 are performed, and we term the modified version as the Multi Run DA
algorithm, MRDA.
“Multi-Round” is a term that refers to the overall mechanism that occurs over days and
possibly weeks, with the repeated involvement and inputs of humans, especially the candidates.
In the context of a mechanism, the acronym MR in MRDA may actually be considered to
refer to Multi-Round Deferred Acceptance scheme. These two concepts – run and round –
are orthogonal: one can perform multiple runs of the DA in situations where only one round
is planned, and de-reservation is necessary; that would be a multi-run deferred acceptance
algorithm. One could also perform a single run per round, and have multiple rounds, and run
the algorithm as in Figure 5.1; this would be a multi-round scheme. Or one could do both,
as performed in the joint seat allocation every year since 2015. In terms of nomenclature, we
choose not to distinguish between these cases as the intent is clear from the context.
DA 
Offer fair and candidate optimal seats  
Update inputs to DA 
appropriately for next round 
• Obtaining programs of all CFTIs (seat matrix) 
• Obtaining preferences of candidates 
• Obtaining rank list 
• Creating virtual (programs, merit, preference lists) 
• Constructing the input to DA 
No 
Rounds = 7 
Yes 
A final fair and candidate 
optimal allocation 
RC Activities: 
• Document verification (credential changes and 
seat cancellation in case any discrepancy is found) 
• Candidates float/freeze/slide/reject/withdraw  
Figure 5.1: Multi-round deferred acceptance allocation.
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5.2 Input for second and subsequent rounds
Apart from seat matrices which remain unchanged throughout all the rounds of seat allocation,
the following input files are updated due to the reporting center activities of each round. These
updated tables are to be used for seat allocation in subsequent rounds.
1. Candidate Table2.
The credentials of the candidates may change during the document verification at the
reporting center during a round. The credentials are updated accordingly in Candidate
table for the next round. In addition, a candidate who is offered a seat may opt for
Freeze/Slide/Float/Reject for the seat allocation in subsequent rounds. This information
is updated in the Candidate table. Candidates who become ineligible for seat allocation
after document verification are removed from the Candidate table in subsequent rounds.
2. Preference list: Based on the changes in the credentials of a candidate, the preference list
of the candidate may have to be updated. In particular, some choices may become invalid
after document verification. (The rules for these are tabulated in the business rules, but
suffice to say that this step is necessary).
3. Previous Round Allotment.
The Allotment Table is one of the output files of the seat allocation algorithm after
each round. Details about the program allotted to a candidate appear here. However, a
candidate who is allotted a seat for the first time in the previous round might not report
at the reporting center (thereby implicitly rejecting the offer). Another possibility is that
a candidate after accepting a seat may surrender it and withdraw from the joint seat
allocation. This additional information is appended to the Allotment table of the round.
The Allotment table at the end of the previous round, is very crucial for computing the
seat allocation for the next round. Hence, for the second and subsequent round, this table
is also provided as an additional input file.
The reader is advised to study Section 10.2 in the Appendix to know more details of the
activities that take place at reporting center and how the input files as mentioned above for the
second (or subsequent) round are computed.
5.3 Preprocessing of input for second and subsequent rounds
Once the input for second (or any subsequent) round is received, it needs to be preprocessed
before we carry out the seat allocation of the round. In particular, the following tasks need to
be carried out (1) Editing preference list as mentioned above (2) Computing Min-Cutoff, the
minimum cut-off rank of each virtual program to ensure (as mentioned in Section 3.3.1) that
no candidate abruptly loses an earlier awarded seat in a later round. We now describe how this
preprocessing is carried out.
2This table stores the credentials of the eligible candidates participating the joint seat allocation.
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5.3.1 Preference list editing
Each candidate who is allocated a program in the previous round (call it N) chooses one of the
following options before the next round (N + 1) is conducted. In each case we describe how the
candidate’s preference list is appropriately edited before round N + 1. This edited preference
list is then used to construct virtual preferences as usual.
• Reject: The candidate rejects the program. In this case, the choice list of the candidate
is set to empty to remove the candidate from the process. (Note that this reference to
Reject is different from the Reject in the algorithm pseudocode.)
• Freeze: The candidate confirms the acceptance of the program allocated. In this case, we
leave the allotted program3 on her choice list along with the entries below the allotted
program, and eliminate all other entries.
• Float: The candidate expresses that the program is acceptable but would like to be con-
sidered for future rounds to get a more desirable program, if possible. In this case, we
leave the candidate choice list unchanged.
• Slide: The candidate wishes to be considered for future rounds but would prefer programs
in the same institute where he is offered the current program. In this case, we remove all
programs from his list that are above the current allotment and belong to the institute
different from the institute of the program offered to him4. The allotted program and the
entries below the allotted program are left unchanged.
• Withdraw: The candidate withdraws from the joint seat allocation. In this case, the
choice list of the candidate is set to empty. Although ‘Reject’ and ‘Withdraw’ ultimately
have the same effect (the candidate will no longer be part of the process), the difference
lies in the timing. Once a candidate is offered a program, and she accepts, she can later
withdraw till the withdrawal deadline.
5.3.2 Computing Min-Cutoff
The seat guarantee across multiple rounds is needed because, as discussed above, the rules
provide for a freeze, float, and slide option. The seat guarantee is implemented by the notion
of Min-Cutoff: A candidate is allowed to retain a seat in round J + 1 if her rank is better
off, or equal to the rank corresponding to the minimum cut-off rank in a virtual program at
the end of Jth round. This rank might be based on her rank, or, more subtly, the rank of any
other candidate previously allotted a seat in the virtual program under consideration. Further,
to avoid merit violation, the candidate may get something even better (from her perspective)
in yet another program based on the minimum cut-off of that program, and this is permitted
even on a supernumerary (SN) basis.
Computing Min-Cutoff: The word minimum in min-cut-off is used to indicate that in
future rounds, the cutoff (or closing rank) can actually become worse (i.e., larger) than the
3In other words, the virtual preference list for the candidate now contains only virtual programs corresponding
to the allotted program and programs ranked below it by the candidate, as per the relevant table (using the
complete row corresponding to the candidate category).
4Virtual preferences over virtual programs remain unchanged for programs that are not removed.
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min-cut-off. Consider any virtual program p. We use the output WaitList(p) of ith round to
compute Min-Cutoff(p) for (i + 1)th round as follows. We temporarily construct a reduced
waitlist for p by removing the following kinds of candidates:
1. Those who opted for reject or withdraw.
2. Those whose seat got cancelled at the reporting center in ith round.
We then set Min-Cutoff(p) for the next round as follows:
• If the reduced waitlist is non-empty, Min-Cutoff(p) is set to Rank(y, p), where y is the
last candidate in the reduced wait list. Note again that, Rank here stores the extended
merit list rank after revision5.
• If the reduced waitlist is empty, Min-Cutoff(p) is set to 0. Thus, nobody applying to p
in the next round will get any min-cut-off benefit.
5.4 Summary
We have described a multi-round deferred acceptance algorithm. After each round, candidates
may reject, freeze, slide, or float with the program offered. As a result, the program allocated to
a candidate in subsequent rounds may differ. In this case, it is guaranteed that the new program
allocated to the candidate will be preferred (by the candidate) to the earlier one. Many other
business rules have been incorporated using the concept of virtual programs, virtual preference
lists, and virtual merit lists. To make all desirable effects happen between rounds, internally
in the data structures, the choices of the candidates need to be modified and possibly their
credentials may need to be changed.
Remark: Section 10.5 in the Appendix presents the complete implementation details of the
generic MRDA algorithm along with all input-output formats. The reader interested in the
actual implementation of the DA algorithm should refer to this section.
5Recall Definition 2. Example: If p is an OBC-NCL virtual program, then we use the last rank in the
standard OBC-NCL merit list. On the other hand, if p is an SC virtual program then we use the last rank in
the extended merit list, which, to recall is constructed by taking the SC rank list followed by the PC-SC rank
list.
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Chapter 6
De-reservations
Recall that the DA algorithm as described in Section 4.4 takes care of all business rule of
categories as described in Chapter 4 except de-reservation. When seats are unfilled due to lack
of candidates in a particular category, seats may be de-reserved.
After a possible allocation to preparatory candidates, if seats in one or more of OPEN-PwD,
OBC-NCL-PwD, SC-PwD, ST-PwD seat categories are still vacant in any program, they are de-
reserved. For example, unfilled SC-PwD seats (that are also not filled with PC candidates) will
be de-reserved and treated as SC category seats for allocation in every round of seat allotment.
Similarly, unfilled OBC-NCL seats will be de-reserved and treated as OPEN seats (there is no
allocation to PC candidates in this case). However, unfilled SC and ST category seats will NOT
be de-reserved.
The de-reservation rules stated above are succinctly depicted in Figure 6.1.
There are two methods of incorporating de-reservation rules. The first and a very simple
method is to change the input seat capacities available in a seat matrix, and move unfilled
seats to the appropriate category, and run Algorithm 2 using the revised seat matrix. This
method involves multiple runs and has been used for the joint seat allocation since the year
2015. This method is described in the following section. The second method involves modifying
the virtual preference lists and the virtual merit lists. This method, along with its advantages
and disadvantages over the first method, is described in the earlier technical report [3].
6.1 Multi-Run DA with De-reservation
Multi-run DA may be viewed as running the method in Section 4.4 several times, each time
updating the seat matrix provided as input by appropriately de-reserving seats that were not
filled in the previous run.
6.1.1 Multi-Run DA Algorithm
The Multi-Run DA algorithm works as follows.
1. We run the algorithm in Section 4.4.1
1With the appropriate table for the virtual preference list depending on the program a candidate applies to,
and the corresponding simplified virtual merit list.
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Figure 6.1: De-reservation. Starting from the bold arrow and following dotted arrows, one
arrives at a possible sequence in which seats are de-reserved. For example, unfilled OPEN-PwD
seats are considered to all eligible preparatory candidates (PC-OPEN-PwD); if at this stage,
seats are still unfilled, they are offered to all eligible candidates (OPEN).
2. If there are unfilled seats that can be de-reserved, then we update the capacities by de-
reserving unfilled seats to the parent category2. We then re-run the algorithm as in Step 1
on all candidates.
If there are no unfilled seats that can be de-reserved, i.e., all unfilled seats are in OPEN
or SC or ST virtual programs, then we terminate.
This algorithm enjoys monotonicity across runs: The options available to candidates are only
enhanced in going from one run to the next. More seats become available in parent programs,
whereas the programs that “lose” seats due to de-reservation do not hurt the allocation since
there is no demand for those seats anyway (in that run or in any future run). Thus, candidates
get the same or better allocation than before. Seats flow only upstream towards parent cate-
gories, cf. Figure 6.1. On tests consisting of various synthetic as well as the actual data during
the joint seat allocation, the number of runs were always less than 5 in the last four years.
Additional Output: The primary purpose of the seat allocation algorithm is to allocate
seats. However, in addition to the allocation of seats, we can output the opening and closing
2We de-reserve any unfilled OPEN-PwD seats to OPEN seats, unfilled SC-PwD seats to SC seats, unfilled
ST-PwD to ST, and unfilled OBC-NCL-PwD to OBC-NCL, and unfilled OBC-NCL seats to OP, and update the
seat matrix appropriately. As an example, if there are two unfilled seats in an OPEN-PwD virtual program, then
we de-reserve them by decreasing the capacity of that virtual program by 2, and increasing the capacity of the
corresponding OP virtual program by 2. It may be noted that the OPEN virtual program may simultaneously
get some additional seats due to de-reservation from OBC-NCL during this step.
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ranks in the Multi-Run Multi-Round algorithm after the last round. We read off the opening
rank for each category if there is any candidate in the virtual program. The closing rank is
the rank of the last admitted candidate in the corresponding virtual program. However, if the
corresponding candidate is from Preparatory Course, we use the following convention. We use
the actual rank of the candidate in the corresponding Preparatory Course rank list and add the
suffix P to it (to indicate “PC”). (Note that the extended merit list is for internal purpose only.
Therefore, we must announce the actual Preparatory Course rank instead of extended merit
list rank).
In addition, we also output the initial seat matrix, and the final seat matrix for each program,
with unfilled seats marked. The final seat matrix is the matrix used in the final run of DA during
which no further de-reservation occurred. The following example shows how to interpret the
initial and final seat matrix together.
Example 5. Consider a program with:
• Initial seat matrix: 20 OPEN seats, 10 OBC-NCL seats, 2 OBC-NCL-PwD seats, and 1
OPEN-PwD seat. (Suppose there are no other seats.)
• Final seat matrix: 21 OPEN seats (18 filled), 11 OBC-NCL seats, 0 OBC-NCL-PwD seats
and 1 OPEN-PwD seat (filled by PC candidate).
The immediate inference is that all 11 OBC-NCL seats in the final seat matrix are occupied,
since if not, they would have been de-reserved. We also notice that the 1 OPEN-PwD seat is
occupied by a PC candidate.
We further interpret the above starting at the lowest level of Figure 6.1. We infer that
2 OBC-NCL-PwD seats were both de-reserved to OBC-NCL, leading to 12 OBC-NCL seats.
Of these OBC-NCL seats, 1 was unfilled (hence the final seat matrix contained 11 OBC-NCL
seats), and further de-reserved to OPEN, leading to 21 OPEN seats. Finally, we infer that 3 of
these OPEN seats were unfilled.
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Chapter 7
Supernumerary seats for females
There are many institutes, such as the IITs, where the percentage of female students in the
undergraduate programs used to be (until 2018) approximately 9% of the entire student pop-
ulation. Stakeholders in the system sought an increase in the gender ratio. The improvement
in the ratio was to be carried out in a phased manner — at least 14% females in 2018, and
thereafter, 17% in 2019 and 20% in 2020.
Until 2017, all seats in a virtual program were allocated in a gender-oblivious manner.
One way to achieve the new objectives would be to declare a 14% reservation, similar to the
reservations based on birth category as described earlier. This was not considered acceptable
since many practical constraints that had to be satisfied. (See also Section 7.3.1.) First, some
programs already had more than 20% females already (even if the Institute did not). It was
not considered acceptable to burden the institute with variable amount of new infrastructure
requirements for the females: seat matrices (i.e., capacities) had to be announced before the
process began. A related constraint was that the number of non-female1 candidates could not
also be increased substantially, 2 or decreased (so as to remove the perceived “injustice”) for
that matter. One way to satisfy this requirement is that the number of non-females admitted
should be close to their numbers in 2017 (to be more precise, average of the last few years) by
dividing the pool into females and non-females. We direct the reader to Section 10.1 for more
insights to some of the difficulties in reducing variability in the number of females admitted
while retaining a modicum of fairness.
We describe how the MRDA algorithm, with suitable changes in the virtual programs and
the virtual preference lists, can ensure at least 14% seats for females in 2018 and fairness for
all candidates while satisfying the constraints stated above.
7.1 The Method
In order to implement the rule of supernumerary seats for females and respecting all the con-
straints, the proposed algorithm will require that each virtual program p has two separate seat
pools defined as follows:
1In this chapter, a male or transgender candidate is considered as a non-female candidate.
2The institutes were already finding it difficult to create the infrastructure for additional females, so it was
difficult for them to create the infrastructure for any additional non-females.
34
• Female-only(p): This pool will be exclusively for females and they will be admitted on
the basis of relative merit.
• Gender-neutral(p): As the name suggests, this pool will admit candidates through merit,
but without any gender bias.
The method of computing the number of seats in Female-only(p) pool and Gender-neutral(p)
pool for each virtual program p is described in Section 7.3. Now we describe the order in which
candidates are considered for a seat in these two pools of a virtual program. It is this order
that plays the key role in establishing the fairness properties of the algorithm.
7.1.1 Order of seat allocation
Consider a virtual program p in the choice list of a candidate c. c will be considered for a seat
in the virtual program p based on the gender as follows.
• If c is a female candidate: c will first compete for a seat from the Female-only(p) pool.
Only after she fails to get a seat from this pool, will she compete for a seat from Gender-
neutral(p) pool.
• If c is a non-female candidate: c will compete for a seat from the Gender-neutral(p) pool
only.
7.2 Fairness properties
The algorithm guarantees the following fairness properties.
Fairness for non-female candidates
• No reduction in the number of available seats.
As shown later in Section 7.3, the number of seats occupied by non-females in the gender
neutral pool of an academic program p (e.g. IIT Kanpur CSE) in 2018 will be equal to
or greater than the number of seats that the non-female candidates got in that program
in 2017. So potentially all the seats of the gender-neutral pool of p may be allocated to
non-females only.
• Guarantee of no-adverse effect.
The algorithm guarantees that at least one of the following properties will hold for each
virtual program p (e.g., IIT Kanpur CSE SC category):
1. The allocation of all seats (the union of the gender-neutral pool and the female-only
pool) of p is purely based on merit without any gender bias.
2. All gender-neutral seats of p are occupied by non-females only.
In order to better understand the second property stated above, we provide an example.
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Example 6. Suppose the number of seats in the gender-neutral pool and the female-only
pool of a virtual program, say IITK CSE SC, are declared as 10 and 2 respectively.
The allocation produced by the algorithm will ensure the following. If less than 10 seats
from the gender-neutral pool are occupied by non-female candidates, then all the 12 seats
from IITK CSE SC are allocated on pure merit basis among all the SC candidates who
competed for a seat in IITK CSE SC without any gender bias.
Fairness for female candidates
• The algorithm will guarantee that each academic program will have at least 14% female
candidates.
• Under no circumstance will a female candidate be denied a seat in a virtual program
while allocating the same seat to a non-female candidate with (i) equal or worse rank
than her, and, (ii) satisfying the same eligibility criteria. (This property ensures that
female candidates can still occupy more than 14% seats on the basis of merit).
7.2.1 Proof of the fairness properties
We shall now establish that the fairness properties mentioned above are indeed guaranteed by
the algorithm. The first fairness property for non-females follows from the construction of seat
matrices as shown in Section 7.3. We shall now establish the second fairness property for non-
female candidates. Let p be any virtual program (for example, IIT Kanpur Civil Engg. SC or
NIT Surat Electrical Engg. Home State OBC_NCL). Recall that there are two seat pools of
p based on gender: Gender-neutral(p) and Female-only(p). We begin with the following two
facts which follow immediately from the order in which female candidates are considered for
seat allocation.
Fact 1: Among the females getting admitted to p, the top rankers occupy Female-only(p) pool
only. That is, those in the female-only pool will have higher ranks compared to those females
in the gender-neutral pool.
Fact 2: Each female candidate applies to Gender-neutral(p) only after failing to get a seat from
Female-only(p).
If there is no female occupying a seat in Gender-neutral(p), then obviously all candidates
occupying seats in Gender-neutral(p) are non-females only. So, in order to establish the second
fairness property for non-female candidates, we need to analyse the case in which at least
one seat of Gender-neutral(p) pool is occupied by a female candidate, say c. Recall that the
seat allocation for Gender-neutral(p) pool is carried out purely on merit basis without any
gender bias/preference. This along with Fact 2 imply that rank of each candidate (including c)
occupying a seat of Gender-neutral(p) must be strictly better than the rank of each candidate
who applied for a seat in p but got rejected. Fact 1 and Fact 2 also imply that every female
candidate occupying a seat from Female-only(p) will have strictly better rank than that of
c. Therefore, rank of each candidate who is allocated a seat from Gender-neutral(p) pool or
Female-only(p) pool is strictly better than the rank of each candidate who applied but failed to
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get a seat in p. Hence, if we had to carry out allocation of Gender-neutral(p) ∪ Female-only(p)
seats on purely merit basis without any gender bias/preference among all the candidates who
applied to p, the set of candidates getting allocated to P will be identical to the current set of
candidates occupying seat from Gender-neutral(p) and Female-only(p) pools. This implies the
second fairness property for non-females.
To establish the fairness property for females, we proceed as follows. It follows from Fact 2
that every female candidate, after failing to get a seat from Female-only(p) pool, competes for
a seat from Gender-neutral(p) pool. Further, each non-female candidate can apply for a seat of
program p from Gender-neutral(p) pool only. Since seats are allocated from Gender-neutral(p)
pool purely on merit basis and without any gender bias/preference, so it can never happen that
a female is denied a seat from p but given to a non-female candidate with inferior rank.
The 14% constraint (for 2018) fairness property is satisfied by the seat capacities mentioned
below. Hence we can conclude that all fairness properties claimed by our algorithm are indeed
satisfied by it.
Note: In order to incorporate the rule of supernumerary seats for females, there are a couple
of simple and intuitively appealing approaches, but each of them have one or more flaws. We
illustrate these approaches in Section 10.1 of Appendix. We encourage the reader to study them
in order to appreciate the non-triviality of the current algorithm.
7.3 Constructing the seat matrices for 2018
Consider an academic program P . Let us first define a few notations.
• C: Seat capacity of P in 2017.
• f : Number of female candidates who were allocated program P in 2017.
We first describe the procedure for computing the number of seats for Female-only(P ) and
Gender-neutral(P ).
• If f is less than 14% of C, we create x additional seats for females according to the
formula:
f + x = 0.14(C + x)
This implies x = (0.14C−f)/0.86. Thus Female-only(P ) will have f+x seats. In case x is
a fractional number, we need to consider its ceiling while rounding it. Gender-neutral(P )
will have C − f seats.
• If f is more than 14% of C but less than or equal to 20% of C, then Female-only(P ) will
have f seats and Gender-neutral(P ) will have C − f seats.
• If f is more than 20% of C: In this case, Female-only(P ) will have 0.2C seats and Gender-
neutral(P ) will have 0.8C seats.
Once the number of seats for Female-only(P ) and Gender-neutral(P ) have been computed for
an academic program P as described above, we need to distribute them among its virtual
programs according the prevailing business rules as follows. For IITs which have only All India
quota, there are eight virtual programs according to the respective categories - GEN, OBC, SC,
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ST, and their PwD counterparts. For non-IIT institutes, there are two types of state quotas:
Home State and Other State (or All India). So there are 16 virtual programs defined by the
quota and categories for these institutes.
Note:
1. In case some JoSAA3 institute wishes to achieve female percentage in the range [14%,20%],
replace 14% in the calculations above by the desired percentage.
2. In case of an academic program of capacity C introduced for the first time in 2018, the
number of seats in Female-only(P ) pool will be 14% of C and the remaining seats will be
in the Gender-neutral(P ) pool.
7.3.1 Supernumerary seats versus reservation for females
The creation and allocation of supernumerary seats for female candidates is fundamentally
different from reservation of seats for female candidates and should NOT be mistaken for any
kind of reservation for females.
Example 7. Suppose a program has 86 Gender-neutral seats and 14 Female-only seats. Further,
let us assume that the top 14 rankers opting for the program are females and the next 86 rankers
opting for the program are non-females.
In the current allocation scheme, the top ranking 14 females will first be allocated the 14
Female-only seats. The non-females will be allocated the 86 Gender-neutral seats.
In contrast, if the Female-only seats were following the allocation similar or equivalent to
“reservations”, then the top ranking 14 females would first be allocated the top 14 Gender-
neutral seats and therefore the remaining 86-14 = 72 Gender-neutral seats would be allocated to
non-females. Further, 14 Female-only seats would be allocated to lower ranked females, thereby
depriving the allocation of the program to the remaining (86-72 = 14) higher ranked non-females.
In this example, with the “reservations” scenario, not only have we increased the infrastruc-
ture requirements for females, some non-females may perceive injustice when a superior scheme
(such as the one described in this chapter) is possible
7.4 Implementation details
The algorithm is implemented by an additional level of refinement for each virtual program.
Recall that till now an academic program was split into various virtual programs on the basis
of the category (total eight) and state quota (All India, Home State, Other State). A simple
way to implement the rule of supernumerary seats for females is to split each virtual program
on the basis of gender. For example, an earlier virtual program of IITs, say IIT Kanpur, CSE,
OBC_NCL will be split into two virtual programs:
• IIT Kanpur, CSE, OBC_NCL, Gender-neutral
• IIT Kanpur, CSE, OBC_NCL, Female-only
3Joint Seat Allocation Authority (JoSAA) is the authorized body for admissions ever since our algorithm
was adopted.
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Likewise, an earlier virtual program of CSAB institutes, say NIT Surat Civil Engineering Home
State ST, will be split into the following two virtual programs:
• NIT Surat, Civil Engineering, Home State, ST, Gender-neutral
• NIT Surat, Civil Engineering, Home State, ST, Female-only
An important issue that needs to be considered for the implementation of the above algorithm is
whether we need to give preference to category or gender while creating virtual preference list of
a candidate. For example, if an OBC_NCL female candidate with a valid GEN rank applies for
an academic program P , what should be the order that should be followed? The candidate will
be first considered for a seat from the Female-only pool of GEN seats for program P followed
by Gender-neutral pool of GEN seats for program P . Thereafter, she will be considered for
a seat from Female-only pool of OBC_NCL seats for program P followed by Gender-neutral
pool of OBC_NCL seats for program P . The justification for the above order is the following:
The candidate is eligible for GEN seats. So attempts must be made to allocate her a GEN seat
before considering her birth category or gender.
Once we have created gender based virtual programs, all we need to do is to create the
virtual preference lists of each candidate based on gender as recommended by the algorithm.
To illustrate this, we provide examples.
Example 8. Suppose c is a female candidate belonging to the SC_PwD category with a valid
rank in SC merit list and CRL. Suppose one of her choices is IIT Madras Chemical Engineering.
Then we create the following virtual programs, in order.
1. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, GEN, Female-only
2. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, GEN, Gender-neutral
3. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, PwD, Female-only
4. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, PwD, Gender-neutral
5. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, SC, Female-only
6. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, SC, Gender-neutral
7. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, SC_PwD, Female-only
8. IIT Madras, Chemical Engineering, SC_PwD, Gender-neutral
Example 9. Suppose c is a non-female candidate belonging to OBC_NCL category with a valid
rank in CRL. Suppose one of his choices is IIT Indore Electrical Engineering. Then we create
the following virtual programs, in order.
1. IIT Indore, Electrical Engineering, GEN, Gender-neutral
2. IIT Indore, Electrical Engineering, OBC_NCL, Gender-neutral
Example 10. Suppose c is a female candidate belonging to ST category. Suppose one of her
choice is NIT Surat Civil Engineering. Suppose her home state is Gujarat. Then we create the
following virtual programs, in order.
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1. NIT Surat, Civil Engineering, Home State, GEN, Female-only
2. NIT Surat, Civil Engineering, Home State, GEN, Gender-neutral
3. NIT Surat, Civil Engineering, Home State, ST, Female-only
4. NIT Surat, Civil Engineering, Home State, ST, Gender-neutral
The following additional points are very crucial in incorporating the rule of supernumerary
seats for females.
• Vacant seats
Vacant seats, if any, from the female-only virtual program, is not to be filled by any non-
female candidate. The justification for this rule is the following: In this case, all seats
from Gender-neutral(p) will be occupied by non-female candidates, satisfying the fairness
property for them. Seats from Female-only pool may have supernumerary seats created
for improving gender ratio only. De-reserving these seats for non-females will defeat the
purpose of supernumerary seats for females.
• Handling foreign candidates [for IITs only]
Foreign candidates will be admitted in gender-oblivious manner only. Each foreign
candidate will be considered for an IIT program if his/her rank is the same or better than
the rank of the closing rank of the corresponding Gender-neutral OPEN virtual program.
• Handling DS candidates [for IITs only]
Recall that there are 2 supernumerary seats for DS candidates in each IIT. These seats
will be gender-neutral only.
• Handling Preparatory Course candidates [for IITs only]
Preparatory course candidates will be handled based on the gender. For example, any
vacant seat from a Female-only virtual program will be offered only to Preparatory Course
female candidates corresponding to that virtual program. Likewise, any vacant seat from
a Gender-neutral virtual program will be offered to all Preparatory Course candidates
eligible for that virtual program.
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Chapter 8
Reduction of Vacancies
As alluded in the introduction, joint seat allocation provides several advantages to the student,
including a single admission window, an aligned academic calendar, and a fair allocation. These
beneficial logistical advantages of having a single admission window is hard to quantify in a
nation as large as India.
In this chapter, we discuss a subset — the impact of the joint seat allocation in terms of
provable reduction in vacancies in the IITs compared to 2014, and leading up to 2018. Since
IIT seats are coveted by a vast majority of engineering aspirants, any reduction is substantially
beneficial. We discuss the vacancies in IITs in Section 8.1, and the vacancies in NITs, IIITs and
other GFTIs (henceforth non-IITs) in Section 8.2.
8.1 Vacancies in the IITs
Table 8.1 lists the vacancies over the years1, and the discernible trend is the reduction in
vacancies even when the number of seats have increased. An increase in the number of seats
should normally result in increase in vacancies, especially since the newer IITs2 are considered
“less desirable”. The reduction clearly shows, and settles, the advantages of the joint system.
Year Participating institutes Total seats Vacancies 2014 and prior institutes only
Vacancies Reduction from 2014
2014 16 IITs + ISM 9,784 594 594
2015 18 IITs + ISM 10,006 341 319 46%
2016 23 IITs 10,572 227 196 67%
2017 23 IITs 10,988 235 200 66%
Table 8.1: The number of vacancies in the IITs over the years reduces substantially.
Note that, throughout the years, not only did new institutes get added in the system, but
12018 vacancy data was not available at the time of writing this report.
2The Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad (ISM) was designated an IIT in 2016. In 2014, the number of vacancies
at ISM resulted in an extra, special, local (secondary-market) spot round. Nevertheless, ISM had 7 vacancies
after this spot round. In 2015, ISM had 33 vacancies, and didn’t feel necessary to conduct a spot round
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the seat matrices of individual institutes also underwent modifications. Thus, the before-after
comparison given here may underestimate, or cloud, the benefits from the joint allocation.
To address this issue, we conducted a counterfactual experiment to better assess how many
vacancies were saved [4]. We simulated the earlier, separate allocation process on the same
input as joint allocation for the years 2015-2017. In these experiments, the candidates would
apply (virtually in the computer) only to the IITs first. Next, they apply only to the non-IIT
programs they preferred more than their IIT allocations. As output, we checked how many
candidates got a better preference than their IIT allocations, and presumed that these would
represent the vacancies in IITs (since these candidates are likely to desert their IIT seats). We
found that the joint process saved 371 (in 2015), 381 (in 2016) and 629 (in 2017) seats in the
IITs.
As an aside, apart from saving vacancies, we found that many candidates obtained a better
seat in the joint allocation scheme. In the earlier (separate) allocation process, a candidate
A could occupy up to two seats: one in an IIT, and another in a non-IIT. Since the joint
process allots her only one of those seats (the one preferred by her over the other), the second
hoarded seat by A could now be offered to another candidate B, resulting in him getting a better
preference. As a ripple effect, the seat vacated by B can now be offered to a third candidate
C resulting in C getting a better preference as well. This cascading effect continues resulting
in a number of benefited candidates, that is much greater than the number of vacancies! The
numbers of benefited candidates were 1,866 (in 2015), 1,807 (in 2016), and 3,672 (in 2017).
8.2 Vacancies in the non-IITs
Since the non-IITs conducted their allocation after the IITs, we didn’t expect them to benefit
from the joint process alone. We also couldn’t judge the impact to them from the counterfactual
experiment. Despite being unable to draw a clear conclusion on the situation here, we report
in Table 8.2 the progression of vacancies in these institutions. We note the reduction, and the
downward trend in the reduction persists.
Year Participating institutes Total seats Vacancies 2014 and prior institutes only
NITs IIITs Other GFTIs Vacancies Reduction from 2014
2014 30 12 16 21,285 5,596 5,596
2015 31 18 18 24,068 5,697 5,141 8%
2016 31 20 18 24,323 4,901 4,379 22%
2017 31 23 20 25,220 6,510 5,380 4%
Table 8.2: Despite non-IITs admitting candidates after the IITs, vacancies in institutions reduce.
Note the section on special round, though.
Special Round To mitigate the relatively high number of vacancies, the non-IITs conducted a
centralized special round in 2015 and 2017. In 2015, in the special round, 5,354 fresh allotments
were made, of which 2,683 candidates did not report, leading to a final vacancy count of 2,883
at the non-IITs. In 2017, 5,352 seats were allotted in the special round, of which 1,522 were
rejected, leading to a final vacancy count of 2,680. Although the special round is quite effec-
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Round 2016 2017
2 70 55
3 293 129
4 805 365
5 2,594 468
6 N/A 4,168
Table 8.3: Withdrawals at the time of reporting for rounds 2 through 6 for 2016 and 2017.
Withdrawals were not possible at Round 1 reporting, and they were not allowed at final round
reporting (Round 6 in 2016 and Round 7 in 2017).
tive at reducing the vacancies after classes have already begun, there is a need to understand
the dynamics of the vacancies in the main rounds in the first place as it indicates a possible
inefficiency in the joint allocation process.
We observe first that the non-IIT vacancies reduced in 2016 with the introduction of the
Withdraw option, but, in absolute numbers actually increased again in 2017. We suspect that
the reason for this was due to a major change in the process. In 2017, school board marks were
no longer considered in determining JEE Main ranks, for admission to the non-IITs. The school
boards can be taken only once; however, the IIT JEE Advanced can be taken twice. Further
complicating the matter, the JEE Mains can be taken three times. Given this set of situation,
game theory based arguments suggest that it is beneficial for more candidates to simply give
up their non-IIT seat at the last minute; they could still get confidently predict to regain these
seats again in subsequent years, if need be.
Indeed, we observed a similar trend in withdrawals as can be seen in Table 8.3 which shows
the number of withdrawals per round in 2016 and 2017. Also, most of the withdrawals happen
in the last possible round (the penultimate round in 2016, 2017 and 2018). We can literally
visualize the candidate hoping against hope that she gets a better preference in the next round,
and, finally, she ends up withdrawing in the end when this hope does not materialize.
If we look at seats refused, as can be seen from Table 8.4, the number of seat rejections out
of fresh allotments goes on increasing as the rounds progress. In 2017 for example, in the 6th
round, 77% of the latest allotments were rejected by the candidates.
Round 2015 (rejections/fresh) 2016 (rejections/fresh) 2017 (rejections/fresh)
1 6,585 / 23,956 5,591 / 24,245 5,920 / 25,114
2 3,571 / 6,954 2,373 / 5,977 2,695 / 6,262
3 2,617 / 3,655 1,330 / 2,487 1,612 / 2,802
4 2,166 / 2,624 1,010 / 1,698 1,180 / 1,905
5 N/A 1,272 / 1,762 1,164 / 1,562
6 N/A <No data> / 3,812 1,312 / 1,688
7 N/A N/A <No data> / 5,259
Table 8.4: The number of seat rejections (when fresh allotments are made) for non-IIT allot-
ments from 2015 to 2017. Note how over 70% of fresh allotments are rejected3in later rounds.
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Based on the above observations, we believe the vacancy problem can be mitigated by
ensuring the following:
• The number of withdrawals is reduced.
• There is ample time after withdrawals for fresh allocations
• The number of rejections in the final round(s) is reduced
In [4], we suggest a few simple changes to the admissions process to obtain these improvements
and hence drastically reduce vacancies. The interested reader is encouraged to go through them.
3Note that seat cancellations (during document verification) are not counted towards rejections, but candi-
dates with seat cancellations may be counted twice in fresh allotments (once at their first allotment, which got
canceled and once again if they get allotted the second time). Also, withdrawals may be counted towards rejec-
tions only when they happen immediately after allotment (this happens very rarely in the data. The reason may
be that the candidate reported first, and then withdrew in the same round). The number of seat cancellations
and immediate withdrawals are generally small (less than a hundred).
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this report we have described the details of a multi-run multi-round deferred acceptance
(MRDA) algorithm used for allocating seats in 100 institutes with approximately 39000 seats
and with over a million candidates. These institutes include the IITs (dictated by the Joint
Admission Board (JAB)), and other centrally funded technical institutions (dictated by the
Central Seat Allocation Board (CSAB)).
Prior to 2014, the allocations were decoupled leading to multiple problems. There were fair-
ness issues (see the example in the introduction), and inefficiency issues such as seat vacancies,
not to speak of logistic nightmare for high school graduates criss-crossing the country seeking
admission towards the end of the admission process.
The method described in this report have been carried out by the Joint Seat Allocation
Authority (JoSAA) for the last 4 years. It is provably fair and optimal in a formal sense.
By providing a single window centralized process, the logistic difficulties of admission from a
candidate perspective has reduced, even while keeping multiple merit lists of the varied institutes
as the criteria for admission, and with no overbooking of seats allowed. It has led to a substantial
reduction in seat vacancies (with further recommendations for adoption for JoSAA) as described
here [4].
From a policy perspective, authorities are urged to bring the entire post high-school admis-
sion process (with multiple merit list criteria) under this one unified process.
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Chapter 10
Appendix
10.1 Alternative algorithms to incorporate supernumerary seats
for females
In this section, we present two simple algorithms which may appear to incorporate the rule of
supernumerary seats for females correctly. However, each of them have one or more serious
disadvantages.
10.1.1 Algorithm 1
This algorithm works as follows. Divide each virtual program into two separate virtual programs
for non-females and females respectively. In the seat allocation process, non-females compete
for non-female virtual programs and females compete for female virtual programs only. The
capacities of these virtual programs may be fixed beforehand similar to our current algorithm
presented in Chapter 7. The idea is that if the applicant pool looks like that of last year, we
will end up with as many non-female candidates in each academic program as in 2017, whereas
extra seats may be created for female candidates in a program as per the requirement.
Disadvantage of Algorithm 1:
This algorithm has a serious flaw — there may be potentially some female candidates who get
denied a seat by this algorithm which they would have got otherwise by merit. This will happen,
if for example, there are many top-ranked females beyond the capacity of the reserved sized
female pool. This violation would defeat the whole objective — in the pursuit of providing a
guarantee of at least 14% seats to females, this algorithm may deprive some female candidates
of their right to compete for seats on the basis of merit. This serious problem in the algorithm
was not merely a theoretical possibility because our simulations on the 2017 data revealed that
the number of such female candidates was non-zero.
10.1.2 Algorithm 2
This algorithm works as follows. First we carry out the usual gender-neutral allocation like the
previous years. We now freeze the allocation of non-females. Let there be i females getting
admitted to a virtual program p. If i is less than 14% of the number of seats in p, we add
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additional seats to program p in an appropriate manner. Now we recompute the allocation for
all females in these female-only programs.
Disadvantage 1 of Algorithm 2:
This algorithm may lead to merit violation as follows. In the process of satisfying the quota,
there will be many programs where additional seats for females are created. As a result, when
we carry out the allocation for females subsequent to the freeze, let’s say a female x gets a more
preferred program compared to the virtual program, say p, allocated to her in the pre-freeze
gender-neutral allocation. Such a female will migrate to the more preferred program, and her
earlier seat (in the gender-neutral category) gets allocated to some other female candidate y
with rank inferior to other candidates in the gender-neutral pool. In other words, now a female
occupies a gender-neutral seat of p with a rank which is worse than a male candidate to whom
virtual program p was denied. So the final allocation is unfair for non-females.
Disadvantage 2 of algorithm 2:
As mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 7, one constraint that has to be followed while
incorporating the rule of supernumerary seats for females is that program capacities (seat
matrix) have to be frozen prior to the joint seat allocation. This is because these capacities
are publicly announced. Moreover they should be determined in a simple, transparent, and fair
way. The allocation produced should not violate the pre-announced capacities. Unfortunately,
Algorithm 2 violates this constraint since the capacities for each round will depend upon the
outcome of the gender-neutral allocation for that round. In addition, there are non-trivial issues
even in the generation of the seat matrices dynamically. We highlight them below through
examples.
Example 11. What if there are only 5 SC seats a program and 3 of them are occupied by
females in the gender-neutral allocation? Should we reserve the 3 seats for females? If so,
it seems unjustified since the 3 females for whom we reserved these seats, most likely, might
have gone to more preferred program after the female-only allocation that we carry out after the
gender-neutral allocation.
Example 12. What if there are only 2 ST seats and both of them are occupied by males in the
pre-freeze allocation? Should we create 0.28 supernumerary seats for females ? If we do not
create any seat, it may lead to less than 14% females violating the mandate of MHRD. If we
create 1 seat for each such virtual program, we overshoot the 14% mark, violating the constraints
of the institute. One could say that we may do it probabilistically: with probability 0.28 create
1 seat and 0 otherwise. But, the institutes will not be ready for the fluctuation it may create in
the number of female candidates.
Example 13. What if nearly 40% seats of a program are occupied by female candidates1. Going
with Algorithm 2, we will freeze 60% seats for non-females and the remaining 40% seats will
be filled by females. One may argue that we should continue to keep 40% seats for females in
this program after the freeze, and before doing the dynamic allocation, since they were occupied
by females on the basis of merit. But in this case, this argument is invalid, because the merit-
worthy females who occupied these 40% seats migrate to the programmes of their higher choices
in the IITs (for example), and these 40% seats will later (in the post-freeze phase) be occupied
by females with much inferior rank. This begins to sound like 40% seat reservation for females
which is against the mandate (at most 20% supernumerary seats for females).
1There are some CSAB programs where it is indeed the case.
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Note: The above examples are not hypothetical. These are real examples taken from the
data of the joint seat allocations of the years 2015–2017.
Based on the above examples, it is easy to observe that there are two fundamental problems
in the dynamic seat matrix generation carried out by Algorithm 2.
1. Algorithm 2 entails creation of the supernumerary seats at virtual program level. This
leads to a fluctuation and hence uncertainty about the number of female candidates ad-
mitted. It may potentially lead to fewer than 14% females in an academic program
(violating the mandate of MHRD) or much more females (infrastructural problems by
institutes). The reader may verify that our algorithm in Chapter 7 does not have these
two shortcomings.
2. Handling of the programs where females are much more than 20% is unjustified. As in
the example, we may end up reserving a large number (e.g., 40%) of seats for females.
Compared to this, our algorithm in Chapter 7 handles it in a much more rational way:
assigns 14% - 20% seats for female-only and the remaining to be Gender-neutral. It still
allows 40% females if they come by merit, but not otherwise.
10.2 Summary of activities at reporting centers
In this section, we provide a summary of the activities that take place at reporting centers
during a round. There are numerous activities carried out at a reporting center. However,
we provide here the details of only those activities during a round that are essential from the
perspective of seat allocation to be carried out for the next round. First we mention the tables
that get updated based on these activities.
1. Allotment table.
For each candidate who is allotted a seat in a round, the allotment table provides the
complete information of the seat allocated to her. This table is one of the output files of
the seat allocation algorithm (see Section 10.5). However, a candidate who is allocated
a seat might not report at the reporting center. Even if she reports, the seat may get
cancelled during document verification. Or the candidate willingly surrenders the seat in
the same or later round, and thus withdraws from the joint seat allocation. This entire
information is captured in two fields, namely, “RStatus” and “Withdraw”. These two
fields are appended to the allotment table of the current round and are used for the seat
allocation of the next round.
2. Candidate table.
Candidate table is one of the input files of the seat allocation algorithm (see Section 10.5).
During document verification, if the credentials of a candidate change, the candidate table
is updated accordingly. To mark that the credentials of a candidate has changed, the value
of “CatChange” field in this table is updated accordingly.
3. Preference list (Choice table).
The preference list of a candidate may change during document verification. For example,
if a candidate is found to be color-blind and the candidate had mentioned Mining program
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in the preference list, then the validity field of mining program in the preference list is
marked N.
Now we provide a summary of the activities at the reporting centers followed by the way the
tables mentioned above get updated based on these activities.
Once a candidate gets allocated a seat for the first time, the candidate has to report at the
appropriate reporting center for document verification and seat confirmation. For this purpose,
“RStatus” field of each such candidate is initialized as NR (acronym for Not Reported) and
“Withdraw” field is initialized as N (acronym for Not) in the beginning of the round. Based on
the activities at the reporting center, these fields are updated appropriately as described below.
If the candidate does not report during the round, the RStatus remains NR, and the candi-
date will not be considered for seat allocation in future rounds. If the candidate reports at the
reporting center, then the following are the possible outcomes.
1. If the candidate is able to produce all the relevant documents and the documents are
verified to be authentic, her seat gets confirmed. RStatus become RP (acronym for Re-
ported). If the candidate fails to produce some document or the documents produced have
any discrepancy, the candidate’s credentials have to be changed. For example, the candi-
date may be claiming to be OBC-NCL, but fails to produce valid OBC-NCL certificate
at the reporting center. In this case, the candidate’s category is changed to GENERAL.
Another example is a candidate who gets Mining program but is found to be color-blind.
There are many other examples that results in change in credentials. The change in
credentials may lead to the following two possible outcomes.
The change in credentials may lead to cancellation of her seat. For example, if a candidate
got seat in OBC-NCL virtual program but fails to produce valid OBC-NCL certificate,
then her seat will get cancelled. Another case is a candidate who gets Mining program
but is found to be color-blind. There are many other cases as well. In each such case that
leads to the cancellation of a seat, the RStatus of the candidate is set to RC (acronym
for Reported and seat Cancelled). The CatChange field of the candidate in the candidate
table will be set to 1 or 4. The candidate will be considered for seat allocation in future
rounds based on the revised credentials.
It is also possible that the credentials of the candidate change but the seat is not cancelled.
For example, if an OBC-NCL candidate gets a seat from OPEN category but fails to
produce valid OBC-NCL certificate at the reporting center. In such case, CatChange
field of the candidate is set to 3. The RStatus of the candidate will be set to RP. The
candidate will be considered for seat allocation in future rounds with revised credentials
(the birth category will be GEN in this case).
Note that a change in credentials may also result in making some choices (programs)
in the preference list of the candidate invalid. For example, if the board marks of the
candidate fail to satisfy the criteria of minimum board marks for admission into IITs
(likewise CSAB), all IIT (likewise CSAB) programs in her preference list will become
invalid. Another example is a candidate who opted for Mining program but is found to
be color-blind. In this case, the Mining program will become invalid in the preference list
of the candidate.
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2. During the verification of the documents, the candidate may be found to be ineligible for
joint seat allocation. In such a case, the seat of the candidate is canceled and the candidate
is removed from the list of eligible candidates (Candidate table) for future rounds. This
candidate will not be considered for seat allocation in future rounds.
At the reporting center, if the seat of the candidate gets confirmed, the candidate may also
exercise her options of Freeze/Float/Slide. Accordingly the “Decision” field of the candidate in
the candidate table is updated to FR/FL/SL. If the seat of the candidate gets canceled but
the candidate is still eligible for seat allocation in future rounds with revised credentials, the
Decision field continues to remain Float. If a candidate does not report at the reporting center,
Decision field is set to RJ.
Note that there may be candidates in the current round of allotment who might have got
a seat in previous rounds which they accepted as well. If the seat remains unchanged in the
current round, then RStatus of such a candidate is set to RT (acronym for seat Retained).
These candidates are not required to report at the reporting center again. But if the seat gets
upgraded in the current round, then there are two possibilities. If the previous seat was in
some CSAB institute and the new seat is in some IIT (or vice versa), then the candidate must
report at the reporting center of some IIT (likewise CSAB institute for the reverse case). The
RStatus of such candidate is set to DR (acronym for Dual Reporting). Processing of such a
candidate is identical to the candidates with RStatus=NR as described above. If the upgraded
seat is still from the same pool of institutes (IITs or CSAB) as that of the previous seat, then
the candidate is not required to report at the reporting center again. RStatus is set to RU
(acronym for Retained and Upgraded) for such a candidate. Once a candidate gets a seat in a
CSAB institute (likewise IIT), and her seat gets confirmed upon reporting at some reporting
center of CSAB institutes (likewise IIT), she will not have to report again at any reporting
center of CSAB institutes (likewise IIT). In other words, in normal circumstances, a candidate
will report at a reporting center of CSAB institutes (likewise IIT) at most once though her seat
may be upgraded multiple times.
In addition to the above activities at reporting center, the candidate may also visit reporting
center for other activities. A candidate has to approach the reporting center if she decides, ever
in future rounds, to exercise Freeze/Float/Slide. A candidate, who got a seat in some round,
may also wish to surrender her seat and withdraw from joint seat allocation for that year. For
this purpose, she has to report at the reporting center after initializing the withdraw process
through his/her JoSAA login. The Withdraw field of such candidate in the Allotment file is set
to Y after all the formalities of withdraw are completed at the reporting center.
Now we describe how the input for 2nd (or subsequent) round is computed based on the
activities at reporting center described above.
1. Updating Candidate table.
The credentials of a candidate may change during the document verification at the report-
ing center during a round. The credentials will be updated accordingly in the candidate
table for the next round. The CatChange field is updated accordingly based on the type
of credentials that got changed. The “Decision” field is also changed based on the option
(Freeze or Float or Slide) chosen by the candidate at the reporting center. Here we would
like to state some more information about Decision field. Once a candidate reports at the
reporting center, the following are the possibilities of the change in this field.
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(a) Her seat is confirmed. In that case, The Decision field may be set to Freeze or Float
or Slide based on the option given by the candidate at the reporting center.
(b) Her seat is cancelled but she will still be considered for seat allocation in future
rounds. Decision field will be set to Float for such candidates.
(c) She does not report at the reporting center. In this case, Decision field is set to RJ.
Note that the candidates who become ineligible for seat allocation after document veri-
fication are removed from the candidate table in subsequent rounds. The converse may
also happen (though it is rare). The board marks of a candidate may increase after re-
evaluation and a candidate, who was ineligible previously, may potentially become eligible
for seat allocation in CSAB institutes and/or IITs (note that these two pools may have
different eligibility criteria of board marks).
2. Augmenting the allotment table.
Based on the reporting center activities as described above, RStatus and Withdraw fields
of the candidates is updated as described above. These two fields are appended to the
allotment table of the current round. This augmented file will be used for computing the
seat allocation for the next round (for computing Min-Cutoff for each virtual program).
It is therefore given as input for the next round and called ‘allotment table of the previous
round’.
3. Updating the preference list (Choice table).
Based on the credential changes, the preference list of the candidate will be updated.
In particular, some choices may become invalid after document verification as described
above. The “Validity” field of such choices is marked N.
Although we provided complete details of the reporting center activities above, a program-
mer needs to focus on the following specific points while writing the code for seat allocation.
1. In order to determine if the seat of the candidate is cancelled, just check RStatus field and
Withdraw field from the allotment table of the previous round. If RStatus=NR/DR/RC,
or Withdraw=Y, the seat of the candidate is cancelled.
2. In order to determine the current preference list, the “Decision” field is required and the
preference list needs to be pruned if needed. Also the validity field of programs in the
preference list needs to be taken into account while reading - If validity field of a program
is N, that program must be skipped while creating virtual preference list of the candidate.
3. For the first 3 years of the joint seat allocation, CatChange field in Candidate table used
to be considered for seat allocation computation in each round. But after a change in a
business rule in 2018 (refer to Section 10.6), this field can be safely ignored as far as seat
allocation in any round is concerned.
10.3 Survey Questions
Candidates who wish to surrender their seat and withdraw from the joint seat allocation should
be asked to fill out a survey before their fees are refunded. This survey should be analysed at
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the end of the joint seat allocation every year so that the efficiency of the joint seat allocation
can be improved in the future years. Here is a possible mini-survey design:
This survey is intended to obtain a detailed understanding of the performance of JoSAA 20xx, and
possibly suggest areas for potential further improvements in efficiency of seat allocation. Complete
privacy of your data is guaranteed. There will be no penalties of any kind based on information entered
here. We appreciate your help in providing us this vital information.
Why did you choose to not take-up your allocation of program ??? in round ??? of JoSAA 20xx?
Please select the appropriate option:
Want to write JEE again.
Admitted to other Institute
(i) Institute name (ii) Date of admission notification
Other. (i) Please specify (ii) Date of decision (select on a calendar)
Thank you for your assistance!
10.4 Validation Modules
An important challenge is to verify whether the output of the DA algorithm for a large test
case (nearly 13 lakh candidates) satisfies various business rules. Validation modules provide
effective ways to achieve this goal. Each validation module will take the input and output files
of the DA algorithm for a round and verify whether the output is indeed correct for the given
input. There are two types of validation modules.
10.4.1 Candidate specific validation modules
There are 6 validation modules required to ensure that allotment meets the business rules for
the candidates.
Fairness
Suppose a candidate c is denied a virtual program p. Then the rank of each candidate getting
p must be superior to the rank of c. This module can be implemented efficiently with the help
of the closing rank as follows. The closing rank of each of the virtual programs that rejected c
must be better than the rank of c. Note that this module seamlessly takes care of the current
implementation of the supernumerary seats for females.
Quota Eligibility
NIT program has home state (HS) and other state (OS) quota. Similarly for other GFTIs, each
program has home state (HS) and all India (AI) quota. Quota eligibility requires the following
condition to be guaranteed for HS quota (similarly for OS and AI). A candidate can be allotted
a seat from HS quota of a program only if she is eligible for the HS quota of that program;
conversely, if the candidate is not eligible for the HS quota, she should not be awarded the seat
from HS quota.
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Category Eligibility
The aim of this module is to verify that a candidate must be assigned seat from the category
for which she is eligible. For example, a SC candidate who does not appear in CRL cannot
be assigned a seat from any OPEN virtual program. In a similar manner, a GEN candidate
cannot be assigned a seat from an SC virtual program.
Candidate willingness
After a given round, the candidates who are allotted programs may opt for any of the following
options: Freeze, Float, Slide, or Reject. These options must be respected while allocating
programs to them in the following rounds.
Seat guarantee in later rounds (Min-Cutoff benefit)
Each eligible candidate will get Min-Cutoff benefit. That is, if c is a candidate applying to a
virtual program p. If rank of c is better than the Min-Cutoff(p), then c will surely be given a
seat in p irrespective of whether or not there is any vacancy in p.
Fairness guarantee for non-female candidates
If the number of non-female candidates in a Gender-neutral virtual program p turns out to be
less than the seat capacity of p, then either there is a vacancy in p or there is at least one female
candidate getting a seat in p.
Fairness guarantee for female candidates
If a male candidate c gets a seat in a virtual program p, then every female candidate eligible
for the virtual program p, must be given a seat in p if her rank is same or better than that of c.
10.4.2 Program specific validation modules
There are two broad validation modules to verify whether the allotment meets the business
rules of the programs.
Validating de-reservation
During multiple runs of DA in a round, the capacity of a virtual program may change due to
de-reservation. Thus within a round, the seat matrix may change. However, the capacities of
the sum of all virtual programs must remain unchanged. The checks we can do here are:
• Sum of capacities of all virtual programs is the same before and after de-reservation. In
fact, the following equation should hold for each virtual program p
NewCap = InitCap + No. of seats de-reserved to p−No. of seats de-reserved from p
• A virtual program from which de-reservation happened cannot have any supernumerary
seat.
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• A virtual program from which de-reservation happened must not be denied to any candi-
date eligible for that virtual program. That is, there should be no eligible candidate who
applied to this program and didn’t get it.
Validating the cause of supernumerary seats
The number of candidates getting a virtual programmay be more than the capacity of the virtual
program. The surplus candidates are given supernumerary seats. The cause of supernumerary
seats may be any one of following:
• Multiple candidates at closing rank (EQ)
• Min-Cutoff criteria (MC)
• Foreign nationals (FR)
• Foreign nationals with multiple candidates at closing rank (FE)
• Foreign nationals getting seat by Min-Cutoff criteria (FM)
• DS candidate (DS)
• DS candidates with multiple candidates at closing rank (DE)
• DS candidates getting seat by Min-Cutoff criteria (DM)
In order to verify the cause of supernumerary seats, additional information has been provided in
the allotment table. The validation module for supernumerary seats should use this information.
In order to assist the people engaged in validating/testing the output of the seat allocation
software, the allotment table will have 2 columns (Flag, SupNumReason). These columns will
be used to compute Min-Cutoff of a virtual program for the next round, provide and verify
the reason for the creation of supernumerary seats in a virtual program. In addition to the
augmented allotment table, the following table will also be output by the DA implementation.
Program Statistics
For each virtual program, the following information will be mentioned.
• Opening rank of the virtual program.
• Closing rank of the virtual program.
• MinCutOff of the virtual program.
• Total candidates allotted to the virtual program.
• Initial and final capacity of the virtual program
• The number of seats that got dereserved to and from the virtual program2
• The number of supernumerary seats created in the virtual program.
2These are two different columns DereserveTo and DereserveFrom
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Allotment comparing module
In order to compare two allotments (produced by two different implementations), a module
that highlights the candidates whose allotment differs in the two allocations may prove to be
very useful. This module will help testing/validating team and may help fixing of a bug, if any.
Such a module was a part of the IITK implementation of the DA algorithm in 2015 and 2016,
and it proved to be very helpful.
10.5 Implementation Details of MRDA
In this section we present the implementation details of the algorithm. In particular, we elabo-
rate on the input, output, and the interface of the DA algorithm along with its interaction with
the reporting center during any round.
10.5.1 Algorithm: interface and interactions
Seat allocations happen in multiple stages (or rounds). The key difference between the first
round and subsequent rounds is that some candidates have seats that the Joint Seat Allocation
Authority (JoSAA) agrees to a guarantee - seats offered in prior rounds (e.g. “Freeze”) will
continue to be available. Having a single implementation of the DA algorithm (with updated
inputs) that works for every round is better than having multiple implementations. We have to
validate only one implementation. We call such an implementation a “generic” implementation.
Figure 10.1 shows the interface (input/output) of the generic DA algorithm.
We provide below a summary of four tables that will serve as input to the generic imple-
mentation of DA algorithm, and also two output tables.
• Seat_Matrix: The table stores the list of programmes of various institutes that partic-
ipate in the joint seat allocation along with their capacities . Seat matrix will remain the
same for each round. (However, internally, during multiple runs, this matrix may change
due to de-reservation.) Seat matrix is obtained from the institutes.
• Choice list of Candidates: This table correspond to the preference list mentioned in our
algorithm. This table stores the choices (programs) of each candidate. For each candidate
the choices will appear in this table in the decreasing order of her preference. The table for
the (N+1)th round is defined by the table for the (N)th round, the candidate willingness
option (freeze/float/slide/reject). The validity field of one ore more program may also be
updated based on the activities at the reporting center. The willingness information is not
a part of this table, but is available in the 63rd column of the Eligible_Candidate_JoSAA
table mentioned below. The initial table is obtained after JEE Mains Rank List and JEE
Advanced Rank List are declared. N is indexed starting from 1.
• Eligible_Candidate_JoSAA (Candidate table): This table stores personal and other
eligibility information of candidates. The information is collected at the time of the
registration for the exam. For JEE Mains, this information can be quite dated, being
collected almost six months in advance. The information in this table is vulnerable,
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Generic MRDA
𝐀llotment
Seat matrix
Candidate choices
Eligible_candidate_JoSAA
Min-Cut-Off
𝐂 (𝒊 + 𝟏)
𝐄 (𝒊 + 𝟏)
𝐌𝐂𝐎 (𝒊 + 𝟏) 𝐀 (𝒊 + 𝟏)
𝐏rogram Statistics
𝐏 (𝒊 + 𝟏)
Figure 10.1: The interface (input/output) of the generic DA algorithm
because, for example, the OBC_NCL status of candidates can change, possibly due to
change in income. This table will be provided externally at the beginning of every round.
For any round, the table will consist of all those eligible candidates who have at least one
valid choice in their respective choice lists. For round (N+1), N ≥ 1, this table will have
meaningful information in the following fields.
– CredentialChange: This field will take value from {1,2,3,4}. For the 1st round, the
value will be 2.
– Decision: This field will be one of Freeze/Float/Slide/Reject/Withdraw depending
upon the option exercised by the candidate after a seat is allocated. This field will
be used for computing the choice list of the candidate for the (N+1)th round.
• Min-Cutoff.
This table will store min-cut-off for each virtual programme. For the first round, it will
be set to 0 for all virtual programmes. Min-Cutoff for a virtual programme prior to the
execution of round (N+1) will be computed using the allotment table of the (N)th round
and the Decision field (column 63) of the Eligible_Candidate_JoSAA file mentioned
above.
The output of the algorithm for each round will be the following two tables.
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• Allotment
This table will store the details of the program, if any, allotted to each candidate. The
allotment table has two significant columns for purposes of multiround DA. Details appear
below.
• Program Statistics
This table will store the details of the program statistics (opening rank, closing rank,
supernumerary information, and de-reservation information).
Please refer to Figure 10.1 for the interface of the generic DA algorithm and refer to Figure
10.2 for various activities that take place during any round.
Figure 10.2 depicts the execution of the algorithm and activities that take place during
(i+ 1)th round.
Round 𝒊 + 𝟏 Round 𝒊 
Generic MRDA 
 𝐀(𝒊) 
Revised 
choice 
list 
 𝐂(𝒊) 
 𝐂 (𝒊 + 𝟏) 
Compute 
Min-Cut-Off 
Eligible_Candidate_JoSAA 
 𝐄 (𝒊 + 𝟏)  𝐌𝐂𝐎 (𝒊 + 𝟏) 
  
 𝐀(𝒊 + 𝟏) 
 𝐀(𝒊) Column  63 
Reporting Center 
• Document verification (possibly category/marks change) 
• Candidates make decisions (freeze/float/slide/reject/withdraw) 
• The validity field in candidate choice file may get updated 
 𝐏(𝒊 + 𝟏) 
 𝐏(𝒊) 
Seat matrix 
Figure 10.2: The activities during (i+ 1)th round
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10.5.2 Input format
The complete details of the three input tables are given below.
Seat Matrix
S. No. Column Name Type Description
1. Quota char(2) AI/HS/OS
2. InstCd char(3) Institute Code
3. BrCd char(4) Branch Code
4. GenderPool char(6) Gender pool with two possibilities:
Neutral or Female
5. OP int Open Seats
6. OP_PwD int Open-PwD Seats
7. SC int SC Seats
8. SC_PwD int SC-PwD Seats
9. ST int ST Seats
10. ST_PwD int ST-PwD Seats
11. OBC_NCL int OBC-NCL Seats
12. OBC_NCL_PwD int OBC-NCL-PwD Seats
13. Total int Total Seats
14. StCd1 char(2) State code of Eligibility
15. StCd2 char(2) State code of Eligibility
16. StCd3 char(2) State code of Eligibility
17. StCd4 char(2) State code of Eligibility
Choice list of a candidate
S. No. Column Name Type Description Remarks
1 RollNo char(8) JEE (Main) Roll number
2 OptNo int Option No
3 Instcd char(3) Institute Code
4 BrCd char(4) Branch Code
5 Validity char(1) NULL (default)- if choice is valid this field will be updated
N - Choice is not valid at the time of Document
verification
Candidate Table
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S. No. Column name Type and Description Remark
Length
1. RollNo char(8) JEE(Main) Roll Number
2. AppNo char(8) JEE(Main) Application
No
3. NAME varchar(46) Candidate Name
4. MNAME varchar(46) Mother Name
5. FNAME varchar(46) Father Name
6. GName varchar(46) Guardian Name
7. SCode char(2) State Code of Eligibility
8. Gender char(1) 1-Male, 2-Female,3-
Transgender
9. DOB char(10) Date of Birth
(DD/MM/YYYY)
10. CAT char(2) GN/SC/ST/BC
11. PwD char(1) 1-YES, 2-NO
12. Nationality char(1) 1-Indian, 2-OCI, 3-PIO, 4-
Foreign (Other than OCI,
PIO)
13. AI_Eng_CRL_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Eng
CRL Rank
14. AI_Eng_OBC_NCL_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Eng
OBC-NCL Rank
15. AI_Eng_SC_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Eng
SC Rank
16. AI_Eng_ST_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Eng
ST Rank
17. AI_Eng_CRL_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Eng
CRL-PwD Rank
18. AI_Eng_OBC_NCL_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Eng
OBC-PwD Rank
19. AI_Eng_SC_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Eng
SC-PwD Rank
20. AI_Eng_ST_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) ) All India
Eng ST-PwD Rank
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S. No. Column name Type and Description Remark
Length
21. Eng_Rem_Symb char(1) JEE (Main) - BE/B.Tech
Eligibility
Remark symbol
‘*’ - Eligible under CRL
‘=’ - Eligible for OBC-
NCL seats only
‘+’ - Eligible for
SC/ST/PwD seats only
‘$’ - Eligible for OBC-
NCL-PwD seat only
‘%’ - Eligible for GEN-
PwD seat only
‘N’ - Non Eligible for Seat
Allocation
22. AI_Arc_CRL_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
CRL Rank
23. AI_Arc_OBC_NCL_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
OBC-NCL Rank
24. AI_Arc_SC_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
SC Rank
25. AI_Arc_ST_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
ST Rank
26. AI_Arc_CRL_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
CRL-PwD Rank
27. AI_Arc_OBC_NCL_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
OBC-PwD Rank
28. AI_Arc_SC_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
SC-PwD Rank
29. AI_Arc_ST_PD_Rank float JEE(Main) All India Arc
ST-PwD Rank
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S. No. Column name Type and Description Remark
Length
30. Arc_Rem_Symb char(1) JEE (Main) - B
Arch/B.Planning Eli-
gibility
Remark symbol
‘* - Eligible under CRL
‘=’ - Eligible for OBC-
NCL seats only
‘+’ - Eligible for
SC/ST/PwD seats only
‘$’ - Eligible for OBC-
NCL-PwD seat only
‘%’ - Eligible for GEN-
PwD seat only
‘N’ - Non Eligible for Seat
Allocation
31. Adv_RollNo char(7) JEE(Advanced) Roll
Number
32. Adv_RegNo char(10) JEE(Advanced) Registra-
tion Number
33. Adv_CRL_Rank float JEE(Advanced) Common
Rank List
34. Adv_OBC_NCL_Rank float JEE(Advanced) OBC-
NCL Rank
35. Adv_SC_Rank float JEE(Advanced) SC Rank
36. Adv_ST_Rank float JEE(Advanced) ST Rank
37. Adv_CRL_PD_Rank float JEE(Advanced) CRL-
PwD Rank
38. Adv_OBC_NCL_PD_Rank float JEE(Advanced) OBC-
NCL-PwD Rank
39. Adv_SC_PD_Rank float JEE(Advanced) SC-PwD
Rank
40. Adv_ST_PD_Rank float JEE(Advanced) ST-PwD
Rank
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S. No. Column name Type and Description Remark
Length
41. Adv_Rem_Symb char (1) JEE (Advanced) - Eligibil-
ity
Remark symbol
‘*’ - Eligible under CRL
‘=’ - Eligible for OBC-
NCL seats only
‘+’ - Eligible for
SC/ST/PwD seats only
‘$’ - Eligible for OBC-
NCL-PwD seat only
‘%’ - Eligible for GEN-
PwD seat only
‘P’ - Eligible for Prepara-
tory seat
‘N’ - Non Eligible for Seat
Allocation
42. Adv_IsPrep char(1) Is eligible for Preparatory
(1-Yes, 2-No)
43. Adv_Prep_SC_Rank float Preparatory Rank for SC
candidates
44. Adv_Prep_ST_Rank float Preparatory Rank for ST
candidates
45. Adv_Prep_CRL_PD_Rank float Preparatory Rank for all
PwD candidates
46. Adv_Prep_OBC-NCL_PD_Rank float Preparatory Rank for
OBC-NCL
PwD candidates
47. Adv_Prep_SC_PD_Rank float Preparatory Rank for SC-
PwD candidates
48. Adv_Prep_ST_PD_Rank float Preparatory Rank for ST-
PwD candidates
49. Adv_AAT_Status char(1) 1-Qualified, 2-Not Quali-
fied
50. Adv_DS char(1) DS Status (1-Yes, 2-No)
51. Adv_colour blind char(1) 1-Yes, 2-No
52. Adv_OneEyedVision char(1) 1-Yes, 2-No
53. Eng_Top_20 char(1) NULL
54. Arc_Top_20 char(1) NULL
55. Adv_Top_20 char(1) NULL
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S. No. Column name Type and Description Remark
Length
56. Board_Mark_Eng float NULL
57. Board_Mark_Arc float NULL
58. Board_Mark_Adv float NULL
59. Board_RollNo varchar Board Roll No
60. Board_Year_Passing varchar Year of passing of class
12th or equivalent
61. Board_Name varchar School Board Name
62. CatChange** char(1) 1,2,3,4 (Default value is 2)
63. Decision char(2) FR: Freeze
FL: float
SL: Slide
RJ: Reject
Credential Change Description
The CatChange field flags the change in credentials of a candidate. The value of this field will
be one of 1,2,3, or 4. The following is the description of different values of this field.
1: If the credential changes are among the following:
1. Nationality change, 2. Home state change, 3. Birth category change
4. DS status change, 5. PwD status change, 6. Gender change
In this case, his/her seat is cancelled.
2: This is the default value. It means no change in candidate credentials.
3: If his/her credentials changed but seat was not cancelled. Example: an OBC_NCL
candidate got a seat from GEN category but his/her OBC_NCL certificate is found to
be invalid at the reporting center.
4: If the credential changes are among the following:
1. OneEyedVision status change, 2. ColorBlindness status change
In this case, the seat of the candidate is cancelled.
10.5.3 Output format
Allotment Table
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S. No. Column name Type and Description Remark
Length
1. RoundNo int Round No
2. RollNo char(8) JEE(Main) Roll Number
3. Birth_Cat char(2) Candidate birth category
4. Optno int Option No
5. InstCd char (3) Institute Code
6. BrCd char(4) Branch Code
7. Rank float Rank used for seat allocation
8. AllottedCat char(4) Allotted Category. 8 possibilities: First two characters
OPNO, OPPH, BCNO, correspond to the birth category
BCPH, SCNO, SCPH, and the second two correspond
STNO, STPH to the PwD status of the candidates
for which this program is reserved
9. AllottedQuota char(2) Allotted Quota (AI/HS/OS/AP/GO)
10. GenderPool char(6) Allotted gender pool with two possibilities:
Neutral or Female
11. Flag char(1) Four possibilities: D: DS seat is given to the candidate.
N: Normal A DS candidate can also receive
D: DS a "N" normal seat.
F: Foreign
P: Preparatory
(Default: N)
12. SupNumReason char(2) NA- Not Applicable (Default) If 5 candidates are at the
EQ- Closing rank equality same closing rank, any 4
MC- Min Cutoff of them can be marked as EQ.
FR- Foreign national Similarly, if 5 supernumerary seats
FE- Foreign national with closing rank equality are created due to min-cut-off,
FM- Foreign national with Min Cutoff any 5 candidates clearing
DS- DS consideration min-cut-off and whose
DE- DS with closing rank equality category didn’t change
DM- DS with Min Cutoff can be marked as MC
13. Withdraw char(1) Two possibilities: Y/N To determine if
candidate has withdrawn
14. RStatus char(2) Six possibilities: To determine the
NR,DR,RC,RP,RT,RU reporting status of candidate
Note: Allotment table output by the seat allocation algorithm has only the first 12 fields. The
last 2 fields, namely “RStatus” and “Withdraw” are appended to the allotment table based on
the activities at reporting center. The resulting table, called allotment table of the previous
round, is used for the seat allocation of the next round.
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Program Statistics
S. No. Column name Type and Description Remark
Length
1. Quota char(2) Quota HS/OS/AI
2. InstCd char(3) Institute Code
3. BrCd char(4) Branch Code
4. VCategory char(4) Category of virtual DSNO if the programme
programme. One among is DS virtual programme.
OPNO, OPPH, BCNO, BCPH, BrCd should be 0000 then
SCNO,SCPH, STNO, STPH,
and DSNO
5. GenderPool char(6) Gender pool:
Neutral or Female
6. OpeningRank float Opening Rank
7. ClosingRank float Closing Rank
8. MinCutOff float The min cut off used This field is computed in the
for allotment in the current round. beginning of the current round
using the output of
the previous round.
9. TotalAllotted int The number of candidates
to whom the programme is allotted
10. InitCap int Initial capacity
11. NewCap int Capacity after de-reservation Includes non-supernumerary
seats given to DS candidates
12. DeReserveFrom int Number of seats that got
de-reserved from this
virtual programme
13. DeReserveTo int Number of seats that got
de-reserved to this
virtual programme
14. SuperNum int Number of supernumerary seats Includes supernumerary
created in this virtual programme seats created due to
all possible reasons.
10.6 Changes in Business rules since 2015
We now state the changes in the business rules that have occurred in the last 4 years of joint
seat allocation. Each of these changes were duly approved in respective JoSAA meetings after
long deliberation, and in some cases justified through scientific analysis of data of one or more
years of the joint seat allocation.
• Preferential allocation of seats for DS candidates.
In 2015, the seats for DS candidates were allotted in preferential manner, and these seats
had to be from the Open category. The reader may refer to Technical Report [3] for the
algorithm to handle DS candidates during Joint Seat Allocation 2015. We have reproduced
this algorithm in Appendix 10.7. However, from 2016 onwards, DS candidates are given
seats in supernumerary fashion.
• Influence of board marks on merit list of CSAB institutes.
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In 2015 and 2016, board marks of a candidate were considered in computing the final rank
of a candidate in the merit list used for CSAB institutes. But from 2017 onwards, the
board marks are used only as qualifying marks. The merit list for admission into CSAB
institutes is based only on the performance in the JEE main exam.
• Provision to withdraw from joint seat allocation.
After accepting a JoSAA seat, a candidate may get a better (from the perspective of
the candidate) program in some other institute outside JoSAA. Such a candidate should
be allowed to surrender her current seat and withdraw from joint seat allocation. But,
there was no provision to withdraw in 2015. Without the provision of withdraw, the seat
vacated by the candidate will never be filled. However, from 2016 onwards, option to
withdraw was provided to the candidates. Each candidate who accepts a seat was allowed
to withdraw till the end of the 6th round (total number of rounds are 7).
• Penalty of CatChange=1 candidates.
During document verification at the reporting center, certain changes in the credentials
may result in setting CatChange field to 1. Not only the seat of such a candidate gets
canceled, as a penalty the candidate may compete only for vacant seats in subsequent
rounds. Such candidate were derpived from Min-Cutoff benefit. The reader may refer to
the Technical Report of 2015 for the details of the algorithm to implement this business
rule. The objective underlying this business rule was to avoid creation of supernumerary
seats. However, it was found through simulations on the data of 2017 that the number of
supernumerary seats avoided by this rule was less than 10. In addition, it was felt that
the penalty imposed by this rule is too harsh for a candidate. So this rule was changed in
2018. According to the new rule, if a candidate’s seat is canceled in a round because of
failure to produce certain documents at a reporting center, the credentials of the candidate
will be changed for future rounds, but the candidate will not have any kind of penalty in
subsequent rounds.
10.7 Detailed algorithm for handling DS candidates as per 2015
rule
In 2015, the business rule specified that DS candidates should be given the best program they
prefer subject to the constraint that there are only two seats for DS candidates per institute.
Moreover, seats to DS category candidate needed to be allocated in a preferential manner from
open category seats and creation of an additional seat (termed a “supernumerary allocation”)
needed to be avoided to the extent possible.3
Our algorithm for 2015 can be divided in two parts. The first part is the same as the
current algorithm described in Section 4.3. After executing DA as described in Algorithm 2,
while handling DS candidates as described in Section 4.3, we may have artificially increased the
capacity of some (open category) programs by maximum of two seats per institute. Therefore,
each seat which has been allotted from a DS virtual program is to be mapped to a virtual open
program, and is thus processed one by one as follows. Let s be one such seat, say, in IITB,
3Supernumerary allocation could not be avoided, if for example, there are three candidates from DS with the
same rank. There can be more complex cases.
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and let c be the candidate who has been given this seat. Suppose c has been mapped to the
EE program in IITB. Let x be the candidate with the worst rank in the open category waitlist
of the virtual program EE in IITB. If there is one more candidate in this waitlist with the
same rank as the rank of x, then we just assign program EE to candidate c and this completes
the processing of seat s (in a supernumerary manner). Otherwise, to take care of the over
allocation, c replaces x. We now run the DA algorithm with x as the candidate not allotted
any program (and so x applies to the next program in her preference list). Note that x may
displace another candidate, and this may lead to a rejection chain.
However, in very rare cases, there is a possibility of an undesired condition arising out
of this rejection chain. We now describe an example of a race condition that may arise while
processing some DS candidates. Thereafter, we present a method for detecting a race condition.
We conclude with a complete algorithm for handling DS candidates as per the 2015 rule.
10.7.1 Example of Race Condition
Let Amar, Akbar, Chetan, and Dhanush be four DS candidates. At the end of the DA algorithm,
Amar, Akbar, and Chetan get their program through a DS seat; But Dhanush gets his program
IITB-Electrical through a GE seat because there were already two better ranked DS candidates
who got DS seats in IIT Bombay. Moreover, let Dhanush happens to be the last ranked
candidate getting IITB-Electrical. Let Bharat, Krish, and Ekansh be the last ranked GEN
candidates in IITD-Chemical, IITD-Metallurgy, and IITK-Mechanical respectively. The details
of all these seven candidates with the programs allocated by the DA algorithm is shown in
Figure 10.3.
Candidate GE 
Rank 
Program Seat 
allocated 
DS status 
Amar 1200 IITD-Chemical DS Yes 
Akbar 400 IITD-Metallurgy DS Yes 
Chetan 300 IITK-Mechanical DS Yes 
Dhanush 200 IITB-Electrical GE Yes 
Preference list of 
Dhanush 
… 
IITB-Electrical 
IITD-Electrical 
… 
Preference list of 
Ekansh 
… 
IITK-Mechanical 
IITB-Electrical 
… 
Candidate GE 
Rank 
Program Seat 
allocated 
DS status 
Bharat 600 IITD-Chemical GE No 
Krish 350 IITD-Metallurgy GE No 
Ekansh 150 IITK-Mechanical GE No 
Figure 10.3: Program allocation by the DA algorithm to 3 DS and 2 GE candidates.
We now describe the processing of Amar, Akbar, and Chetan who got DS seat. These
candidates have to be given OPEN seats. In order to accommodate Amar, we need to remove
Bharat and this leads to Bharat getting some other less preferred program in the rejection
chain. In a similar manner, Akbar gets IITD-Metallurgy after removal of Krish and Krish gets
some other less preferred program in the rejection chain. Let us process Chetan now. Since
Chetan got seat IITK-Mechanical through DS quota we need to remove Ekansh from IITK-
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Mechanical. Next preferred program for Ekansh is IITB-Electrical. Recall that Dhanush is the
last ranked candidate getting IITB-Electrical. Notice that though Dhanush is a DS candidate,
he got OPEN seat in IITB-Electrical. So Ekansh will remove Dhanush from IITB-Electrical. So
Dhanush will apply for his next preferred program which is IITD-Electrical. There are already
two DS candidates Amar and Akbar for IITD. Since Dhanush has better rank than Akbar, and
Akbar has better rank than Amar, so Dhanush will remove Amar from DS virtual program of
IITD. So the processing of Amar in the past goes waste since he is not getting a DS seat in
IITD (the seat vacated by Bharat for Amar goes waste, the seat remained vacant in the end
and Bharat got a less preferred program). A similar example can be constructed wherein the
DS candidate who initiates a rejection chain will have to be de-allocated. In any such situation,
we should revert the rejection chain and allocate the DS candidate a supernumerary seat. In
the current example, Chetan has to be given a supernumerary seat in IITK-Electrical program.
10.7.2 Detecting Race Condition
After processing each seat s, we need to check for race condition. Some key points to be noted
about race condition are:
1. In the above example, if Dhanush had also applied for IITD-Chemical instead of IITD-
Electrical, it would not have been a race condition. This is because, Dhanush will now
simply occupy the space created by the processing of Amar in IITD-Chemical Open virtual
program. Note that this doesn’t result in any program being vacant and hence there is
no race condition.
Thus, for race-condition-free allocation, candidates in a processed seat may change but
their programs should not.
2. The number of candidates in any DS virtual program can be variable due to the rule of
supernumerary allocation to same ranked candidates.
We gather that for any candidate x occupying a processed seat in old allocation (before process-
ing of seat s), there must be a candidate x′ occupying a processed seat in new allocation such that
x and x′ have the same DS virtual program and x.allotted_program = x′.allotted_program.
If this condition does not hold after processing of a seat s, we have a race condition and we will
need to give the candidate occupying s a supernumerary seat.
To summarize, we need to verify that the allotted programs to processed seats in Old
allocation of a DS virtual program constitute a subset of allotted programs to processed seats
in New allocation of the same DS virtual program. If this holds true for all DS virtual programs,
then we can proceed with processing further seats, otherwise we need to revert to old allocation
and give a supernumerary seat to the latest processed DS candidate.
To check the above condition, after we process a seat, we iterate over processed seats in old
allocation (including the latest processed seat), for each allotted program of a processed seat,
we find a matching processed seat in new allocation with the same allotted program. If at any
point, no such match is found, we declare that there is a race condition and we need to revert
to old allocation (before the processing of latest seat) and make one supernumerary seat.
10.7.3 Pseudocode
We now provide full details of the algorithm in this section.
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Details of the algorithm
The algorithm maintains the set D of seats in all DS programs. Since, due to ties in multiple
DS candidates, number of seats in any program may change during the course of the algorithm,
we keep D as an instance of allocation object. The algorithm processes the seats from D
sequentially. At each stage, it also maintains a flag Is_processed (initialized to false) for each
seat in D. After processing a seat, this flag is set to true. It picks an unprocessed seat s from D
and does the following. Let x be the candidate occupying the seat s and p be the program opted
by him/her. Let w be the worst rank candidate from OPEN category who has been assigned
program p. w is removed from program p and the capacity of p is reduced by 1. We now
start DA algorithm with input {w}. Effectively, the candidate w applies to the next program
in his/her preference list. This generates a rejection chain resulting in a different allocation
than before. Let the allocation before processing be old-allocation and allocation after
processing be new-allocation. It is quite possible that the candidate corresponding to any
processed seat in new-allocation.D is different from that in old-allocation.D. However,
if the set of programs associated to the processed seats of new-allocation.D differs from
that in old-allocation.D, we revert to new-allocation, create a supernumerary seat for
p and allocate it to x.
We need to consider each DS seat one-by-one, create their respective rejection chain and
revert it if it causes race condition. To detect race condition after processing a seat s, all we need
to do is to check if the multiset S1 of allotted programs to processed seats in old-allocation
is a subset of the multiset S2 of allotted programs to processed seats in new-allocation.
Note that, there cannot be a new processed seat created in new-allocation (s is marked
processed in both old-allocation and new-allocation). Hence, |S2| = |S1|. Therefore, in
order to detect race condition, all we need to do is to verify whether S1 = S2. If S1 6= S2, then
there is a race condition, else there is no race condition. Notice that S1 and S2 are multi-sets
and so they should be matched element by element for equality. An element is a program (i.e.
IITK_CS, IITK_CE etc. That is, consider branch names augmented with institute names).
Algorithm 3 presents the complete pseudocode of the algorithm for handling the rule for
admission of DS candidates.
Notations
candidate(s): candidate to whom DS seat s is allocated. Set to φ if the seat is unoccu-
pied.
program(s): OPEN virtual program corresponding to program allocated to candidate
occupying DS seat s. Set to φ if the seat is unoccupied.
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm to incorporate the rule for admission under DS category
INPUTS:
The regular inputs for DA.
The Boolean supernumerary-ok, which indicates whether a supernumerary seat may be
created if a DS related problem occurs. Initially we run with supernumerary-ok=False
Each seat has a Boolean flag Is-Processed. We initialize it as Is-Processed=False for all
DS seats.
OUTPUTS:
The regular output of DA, as well as the waitlists for the DS virtual programs (these include
the name of the actual program allotted to each candidate).
The list of stained programs S. If non-empty, this would be a trigger to get permission from
the JAB Chairman and rerun with supernumerary-ok = True.
1: for all Institutes do
2: Create a DS virtual program I.
3: c(I)← 2
4: Merit(I)← DS candidates in CML in CML order
5: WaitList(I) will be an augmented waitlist, such that each entry will contain both a
candidate as well as a program name.
6: end for
7: for all candidates x with DS tag do
8: Create Pref(x). For each program, first list virtual programs as usual as per birth
category of x, then list corresponding institute DS virtual program (tag it with the relevant
program).
9: end for
10: Run the DA algorithm
11: Allocation ← WaitList(p) ∀ p ∈ P and i(x) ∀ x ∈ A as per the output of the DA
algorithm
12: allocation.D ← List of seats in all DS programs in allocation. A seat data-structure
includes a candidate, a program, and a Boolean flag Is-Processed.
13: for all s ∈ allocation.D do
14: s.Is-Processed← false
15: end for
16: S ← Empty list . List of stained programs S is needed only if supernumerary-ok =
False
17: while ∃s ∈ allocation.D with ([s.Is-Processed]= false and candidate(s) 6= φ) do
18: old-allocation ← allocation;
19: L←processSeat(s)
20: Q← Empty queue
10.8 History and background
This appendix provides some background regarding the institutions and examinations involved.
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21: for all y ∈ L do
22: Remove y from WaitList(p)
23: Reject(y) . This adds y to Q as well
24: end for
25: Run DA with current i(x′), WaitList(p) and Q as inputs (other inputs as usual).
During the run, if a DS candidate x′′ is pushed out of a DS seat and the set of programs as-
sociated with the processed seats in that DS virtual program changes, add the corresponding
OPEN virtual program to a list S of stained virtual programs.
26: allocation ← Output of DA . DA may maintain a list of affected DS virtual
programs to make the loop below more efficient
27: to-revert ← IsRaceCondition(allocation,old-allocation)
28: if to-revert then
29: if supernumerary-ok then
30: allocation ← old-allocation
31: Increment c(p) by 1;
32: else
33: Do nothing . S now
includes both programs that lost a DS candidate after making room, as well as those that
gained a DS candidate and may have a supernumerary seat (but will not be processed by
the algorithm since that seat has been already processed).
34: end if
35: end if
36: allocation.D ← List of seats in all DS programs according to allocation
37: end while
38: return allocation and S; . Note that if a DS candidate has gotten a seat
via DS in program p, he is not included in WaitList(p). This must be read separately by
reading the augmented waitlist WaitList(I) (which specifies both the candidate and the
program) where I corresponds to the institute that hosts p.
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39: function processSeat(s)
40: s.Is-Processed ← true;
41: x← candidate(s);
42: p← program(s);
43: Decrement c(p) by 1;
44: L ← List of all candidates who must be rejected from WaitList(p) based on updated
capacity, Min-Cutoff(p) etc. . In case of no ties, L will contain one candidate if the last
candidate does not clear Min-Cutoff(p), and zero candidates otherwise.
45: Return L
46: end function
47:
48: function IsRaceCondition(new-allocation,old-allocation)
49: S1 ← multi set of allotted programs to processed seats in new-allocation.D . a
program is institute+branch
50: S2 ← multi set of allotted programs to processed seats in old-allocation.D . a
program is institute+branch
51: if S1 = S2 then
52: return False;
53: else
54: return True;
55: end if
56: end function
Students in India must write a senior high school graduation exam (known as the “Board
exam”); these are administered by the educational board to which their high school is affiliated.
However, these exams necessarily account for the wide heterogeneity in the preparation of stu-
dents across schools and geographies. Hence, scores in these exams are typically not considered
appropriate for determining admissions to the country’s most prestigious engineering colleges.
History of admissions to the IITs. The first five IITs (Kharagpur, Bombay, Kanpur,
Madras and Delhi) were founded during 1951-61, and almost immediately they created a coun-
trywide Common Entrance Examination for admissions purposes. The examination was used
to produce a single ranking called a “Merit List” of candidates (more precisely, one Merit List
for each “category” of students, see Table 4.1). Next, in a centralized process, candidates were
then considered in the increasing order of rank (starting with the top ranker), and allotted
their most desired program which was not already full based on the preferences over programs
that they submitted after “counselling” at the closest IIT. [This mechanism is known as Serial
dictatorship, e.g., see [2] The name of the examination subsequently changed to Joint Entrance
Exam (JEE), and the number of IITs has grown to 23. As the number of candidates grew, the
IITs resorted to a two stage examination process, with the first “screening” stage used to select
a subset of candidates who could then write a more detailed second stage exam.
History of admissions to the non-IIT CFTIs. Starting in 1959, Regional Engineering
Colleges (RECs) were created in every major state to supplement the IITs. The admissions
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to these colleges was conducted in a decentralized manner and many of them conducted their
own entrance exams, creating a logistical nightmare for high school students who were aspiring
engineers. In 2002, the RECs were renamed National Institutes of Techonology (NITs), and
a single All India Engineering Entrance Examination (AIEEE) was created to centralize the
examination and admissions process for the NITs, simplifying the logistics. (There are now 31
NITs.)
Several Indian Institutes of Information Technology (IIITs) were established starting in 1997;
that exclusively offered programs allied to information technology. (There are now 23 IIITs.)
Admissions to the IIITs as well as other engineering colleges funded by the central government
were clubbed with admissions to the NITs.
Merger of Examinations. Subsequently the AIEEE was merged with the first stage of the
two stage IIT exam process in 2012. The first examination is called the JEE Main. The JEE
Main score of candidates is used as follows:
1. The non-IIT CFTIs use the JEE Main scores to construct their Merit Lists and determine
allocation of seats at the non-IIT CFTIs. Until 2016, the Merit Lists were created by a
combining the JEE Main score of a candidate with her Board exam score. Since 2017
they are exclusively based on the JEE Main score.
2. The IITs use the JEE Main scores to determine a subset of about 150,000 candidates (as of
2015) who qualify to be permitted to write the second stage “JEE Advanced” examination.
The JEE Advanced examination is conducted subsequently by the IITs for their own admissions
purposes, and typically consists of three separate exams for Physics, Chemistry and Math.
Subject cutoffs are set for each of the three, and a Merit List of candidates who clear the cutoff
is constructed based on their total score across the three subjects for purposes of admission to
IIT programs. (Detailed tie-breaking rules ensure that ties in the Merit List play a negligible
role, and similarly for the Merit Lists for the non-IITs umbrella.) The Board exam score of
candidates is not used for ranking but purely to determine their eligibility based on a cutoff.
From 2012 to 2014, the seat allocation process for IITs (under IITs umbrella) remained
separate from that for the non-IIT CFTIs (under non-IITs umbrella). The IITs conducted their
admissions first, even before the Board exam scores had come in (since almost all successful
candidates obtained the requisite Board exam score), and the non-IITs umbrella conducted its
admissions process subsequently.
Merger of Seat Allocation processes. After the merger of examinations, an external
nudge in the form of a public interest court case W.P.(C) 2275/2010 in the Delhi High Court
(demanding coordination to reduce vacancies) caused the creation of a joint seat allocation
process.
Following a false start in 2013, a common seat allocation process for all the CFTIs including
the IITs was launched in 2015, run by the Joint Seat Allocation Authority (JoSAA). This joint
seat allocation process is the subject of the current paper. JoSAA provided candidates with a
single window for admission to any of the over 80 CFTIs.
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Design Insight. Centralization can greatly reduce the logistical burden of participation on both
sides of the market (in addition to improving the allocative efficiency and reducing market
congestion if the allocation is also done centrally).
Related efforts elsewhere include the Common Application for applying to hundreds of col-
leges worldwide (in this case the allocation is not done centrally), centralized school admissions,
and centralized labor markets (see Section 2.3). In the case of the CFTIs, centralization has
occurred for the examination, application as well as the seat allocation processes.
In 2015 and 2016, the JoSAA seat allocation process was conducted after the JEE Main,
JEE Advanced, and Board exam scores became available. Delays in announcement of Board
marks was a major issue, indeed the joint process was very nearly called off the very first time
in 2015 due to such delays. The IITs wanted to proceed with their allocation, whereas the other
institutes were unable to rank candidates without Board marks being at hand.
Design Insight. Aggregation of all relevant information and alignment of timelines of the
concerned institutions can be bottleneck for centralized matching/allocation. If institutions con-
struct their preferences based on the same information (and at the same time), this improves
the chances of successful centralization.
Since 2017 the non-IIT CFTIs chose to stop using Board exam scores for constructing their
Merit Lists, eliminating this issue, consistent with the trend of logistics getting simpler over
time.
In Appendix 10.8.1, we briefly discuss the broader impact of the JEE. We emphasize here
that our mandate was restricted to designing an efficient and fair joint seat allocation mechanism
for the 80+ institutions involved (the CFTIs), that respects a set of business rules, treating the
JEE as a given.
10.8.1 Broader view of the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE)
The entire examination and seat allocation system for the CFTIs in India under JoSAA based
on the JEE is generally viewed as providing a good solution to the problem of resource alloca-
tion in a supply constrained environment. It is heartening that allegations of cheating in the
examination are highly atypical despite that 1.3 million candidates write the JEE Main each
year, and allegations of corruption in terms leaking of exam questions or grading malpractice
are similarly atypical, despite the extremely high stakes. The exam is also viewed as being fairly
successful at identifying talented candidates (however, many candidates may not really be in-
terested in engineering; a large fraction of successful candidates see an engineering education
as a stepping stone to lucrative careers in other fields).
The main questions that do arise about this system are around the demands and incentives
it generates for candidates and the JEE coaching industry that has grown exponentially around
it. Some of the concerns that have been voiced are: (i) Wealthy candidates have an increasing
advantage due to coaching classes becoming increasingly adept at systematically preparing
candidates, and charging very high fees. (ii) Candidates are “burned out” even before they
start their studies at these institutes due to at least two, many times three, and often six years
of extremely intense preparations merely in order to gain admission. As such, they often do
not invest in their education as engineers, and a majority of them do not work in or around
the area for which they are trained. Instead, they go into consulting, finance and information
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technology. (iii) Related to the above, candidates may “lose” years due to repeating the JEE
after they have graduated from senior high school. (Previously, candidates would commonly
lose multiple years and write the JEE three times, for instance. Since 2010, the rules prohibit
writing the JEE Advanced more than one year after completing the 12th grade, whereas the
JEE Main can still be attempted up to two years after.) There are no ready solutions for these
issues. Reservation of seats for different categories of students (see Chapter 4) is obviously a hot
button topic which is heavily debated by stakeholders, observers and the government alike. We
remark here that changes to the examination system and the reservation rules are serious issues
that were fully outside the scope of the joint seat allocation project that this paper describes;
we are providing a description here merely to provide the interested reader with some context.
Our mandate was to design a seat allocation process with high allocative efficiency that while
preserving good properties of the legacy mechanisms such as fairness, i.e., a candidate with a
better rank in the relevant Merit List should not be denied admission to a program if another
candidate with a lower rank was granted admission to that program.
10.9 The challenge and the opportunity of overbooking
The fraction of Rejects from among fresh allocations is quite large, especially in later rounds.
One may think of using yield prediction (i.e., admitting more candidates than the capacity of
the program) as a way to improve the efficiency of allocation and to have less vacancies at
the end of all the main rounds. This is harder than it would seem, despite the fraction of
rejected fresh allocations being 60% or more in later rounds. Consider Round 3 in 2015. There
were 7342 candidates whose allocation changed including 3720 fresh allocations. There were
2666 Rejects, almost all (2651 of them) from among the fresh allocations, meaning that 71.6%
of fresh allocations were rejected! It is tempting to think that one can use yield prediction
to substantially take care of the issue of Rejects. Unfortunately, this does not work out as
expected. Even for an individual program whose size may be 50 or 100 seats, a lot of virtual
programs (split by category and further by Home State vs All India quota for NITs and many
CFTIs) – with the exception of the OPEN and sometimes the OBC virtual programs – have
a single digit number of seats, minimizing our ability to benefit from yield prediction when
overage (i.e., admitting more candidates than the number of seats) is a problem. In fact, if
we consider the subset of virtual programs with 10 or more rejected seats in that round, this
accounts for only 740 of the 2666 Rejects. Thus, roughly, one could only hope to account for
about 30% of the Rejects (roughly those that occur in virtual programs with 10 or more Rejects,
since with 5 Rejects, Poisson(5) has a reasonable likelihood of being 0 and even more chance of
being 1, so there is minimum benefit from yield prediction), without risking significant overage.
60− 80% Rejects are present across categories, though the OPEN category has slightly higher
fraction of Rejects closer to 80% and accounts for 1647 of the Rejects, meaning more than 60%
of them. We do notice some patterns like if there are 4 or more fresh allocations then there is at
least 1 Reject, if there are 6 or more fresh at least 2 Rejects, with 10 or more fresh at least 40%
are Reject and with 20 or more at least 70% are rejected. Such observations may be the basis
of refined business rules for conservative yield prediction to improve the efficiency of allocation.
Use of an opaque/complex predictive model is not desirable due to lack of transparency and
possibility of unfairness etc. In this context, it is imperative that the business rules must be
transparently and completely specified, and be clearly fair to all concerned, in accordance with
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the prevailing laws. So far, this option has not been considered. However, it may be worth
considering, based on the following reasoning: currently, about 70% of vacancies in a given
round persist until the next round. So over two rounds, the number of vacancies is reduced to
about 70% of 70% = half. Instead, suppose we use some conservative yield prediction as above,
and it reduces the vacancies in the resulting allocation by about 30%. This means that now,
70% of (100−30)% = 50% of vacancies in a given round persist until the next round. Over two
rounds then, the number of vacancies is reduced to about 50% of 50% = 25%. The cost of doing
this would be, in worst case, a handful of seats allocated in excess of capacity, maybe about
10 in total (though we would aim for 0 supernumerary based on data from the previous year).
In a system with over 30,000 seats, this would appear to be a very small aberration. On the
other hand, the benefit may be substantial: In 2017, 4168 candidates withdrew in the reporting
following the Round 6 allocation. After Round 6 there was only one more main round (Round
7), so 70% or more of these 4168 seats (i.e., over 3000 seats) remained unfilled at the end of
all the main rounds. Note that Round 5 happened only two days before Round 6. One would
expect that if withdrawal was permitted only until Round 5, then most of these 4168 candidates
(say, 4000 of them) would have withdrawn by then, and then with two more main rounds of
seat allocation with conservative yield prediction as above, only 25% or about 1000 of these
vacancies would have remained at the end of the last main round (Round 7). Similarly, under
such an approach, the vacancies resulting from rejected seats would also be more effectively
dealt with.
Finally, we remark that steps should be taken to ensure that only serious candidates par-
ticipate in the last rounds of admission after the Withdraw option is closed. For example, if
a candidate wants to participate in such a round, she should be required to explicitly state
that. Currently, all unallotted candidates are a part of future rounds by default. Making the
candidate report physically, or pay the fee upfront could be a powerful tools to filter candidates
who are not serious.
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